The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [216]
In response, the ROK Foreign Ministry devised and presented to Washington a "two plus two" formula, whereby the two Koreas would negotiate a permanent peace treaty to replace the Korean War armistice, with the United States and China acting as facilitators and eventual guarantors. The State Department welcomed the proposal as a step in the right direction if it were serious and well-prepared, and if Washington were kept informed of what Seoul's diplomats were doing.
The "two plus two" proposal, while still confidential, was enough to obtain the recognition Kim wanted. He was granted a four-day state visit with full honors, including an address to a joint session of Congress. In a conversation at the White House during the visit in late July, Kim looked Clinton in the eye and told him, "We are going to do this on August 15," the fiftieth anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japan and a day for important pronouncements in Seoul. Kim's aides leaked the proposal to the South Korean press, and the ROK president himself said in an interview with CNN that he planned to make "a refreshing and important initiative towards North Korea" on Liberation Day. Based on Kim's assurance, Secretary of State Warren Christopher took up the proposal with Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen in a bilateral meeting in Brunei.
After returning to Seoul, however, Kim executed another of his sudden reversals in the face of the conservative political tide following North Korea's interference with ROK ships delivering rice to DPRK ports. Without consultation with or notification of the United States, Kim scuttled the initiative he had proposed to Clinton. American diplomats were not pleased.
In the spring of 1996, summit diplomacy reappeared when Clinton planned a state visit to Japan. At this point the U.S. administration was increasingly apprehensive about the reports of privation and instability in North Korea and none too happy with Kim's inconsistent and, lately, unresponsive policies. Although American presidents usually stopped in Korea when visiting Japan, Clinton was not inclined to do so this time. Considering Clinton's earlier visit to Seoul and Kim's two visits to Washington, "we thought we'd done enough" for Kim, said an administration official who was involved in the internal discussions. No stop in Korea was planned.
Kim, however, had different ideas. Clinton's schedule would bring him to Japan on April 16, just five days after the nationwide National Assembly elections in Korea that would have a crucial bearing on Kim's authority in his last two years in office. For it to be known in the campaign period that Clinton planned to visit Japan but bypass Korea could be a sign of little regard for Kim; indeed, there were reports in Seoul that the president's longtime rival, opposition leader Kim Dae Jung, was preparing to make the omission an issue. The ROK president was desperate to persuade Clinton to change his mind about a Korean stopover.
In a repeat of the previous year's discussions, Ambassador Laney, who was gravely concerned about the lack of movement in North-South diplomacy, told the Blue House that Clinton could only spare the time for such a visit if a serious peace initiative were to come out of it. Talks between Clinton's national security adviser, Anthony Lake, and his Korean counterpart, Yoo Chong Ha, produced agreement in principle for the two presidents to undertake and announce such an initiative.