The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [264]
On U.S. "cool and aloof" policy, Gleysteen interview, Oct. 12, 1993. For U.S. intelligence, Gregg and Aaron comments, Gregg to Brzezinski memo, July 1, 1979, secret (declassified 1997).
The Fight to Save Kim Dae Jung: Lilley on Kim Dae Jung, Lilley interview, June 8, 1993. Gregg on Chun's "terrific pressure," Gregg interview, Mar. 12, 1995. ROK contemporaneous notes of the discussions were published in Kwan Young Ki, "Behind the Scenes: Chun Doo HwanReagan Relationship," Monthly Chosun (Aug. 1992). Chung Ho Young on Kim "card," Chung interview, Apr. 20, 1994. On Allen's discussions regarding Kim Dae Jung, Allen interviews, Dec. 27, 1993, and Jan. 14, 1994, plus interviews with Sohn Jang Nae on Apr. 21 and 29, 1994, and with Chung Ho Young, Apr. 20, 1994.
Gleysteen on Chun's visit to Washington, Emb, cable, "Agenda Suggestions for Reagan-Chun Meeting," Jan. 22, 1981, secret (declassified 1996). Haig views, Memorandum for the President from Alexander Haig, Jan. 29, 1981, secret (declassified 1993). The U.S. buildup data are from USFKHist., "Personnel Strength in Korea," Nov 25, 1996. F-16 offer, DOS cable, "President Chun's Meeting with President Reagan February 2, 1981," Feb. 12, 1981, secret (declassified 1996). For Carter's refusal to approve F-16 sale, Memorandum for the President, "Harold Brown's November Asian Trip: Decision to Proceed with F-16 Sale to Korea," November 1, 1978, top secret (declassified 1997). Reagan's quote on dissenters, Zbigniew Brzezinski interview, Mar. 1, 1994. See also Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (Bantam Books, 1982), p. 578.
CHAPTER 6: TERROR AND TALK
An authoritative account of the fate of KAL 007 is Murray Sayle, "Closing the File on Flight 007," New Yorker, Dec. 12, 1993. On Soviet decisions about trading, Georgi Toloraya interview, May 4, 1994. Details on the Rangoon bombers and the bomb are taken from the official account of the Burmese government, as published in the Guardian newspaper, Rangoon; and from the Burmese government report to the UN General Assembly, reprinted in KH, Oct. 4, 1984. Koh on the African assassination plot, Koh Yong Hwan interview, Oct. 25, 1993.
On Chun's amended schedule in Rangoon, Lho Shin Yong interview, May 27, 1993; Richard L. Walker interview, Feb. 18, 1995. On North Korean plans after Chun's assassination, Kang Myung Do interview, Apr. 11, 1995. See also Don Oberdorfer, "N. Korea Reportedly Set Coordinated Offensives After Rangoon Blast," WP, Dec. 2, 1983.
Proposal to bomb North Korea in retaliation, Kang Kyong Shik (who had been minister of finance before Rangoon and was later Blue House chief of staff), conversation in Washington, Mar. 22, 1995. Chun on his talk to ROK commanders, Kim Sung Ik, Voice Testimony of Chun Doo Hwan (Chosun Ilbo, 1992), in Korean. Chun statements to Walker, Walker interview, Mar. 30, 1995; also Harry Dunlop (former U.S. political counselor, Seoul), interview, Jan. 12, 1994; Reagan's quotes, "Presidential Visit Meetings in Seoul," Memorandum from Assistant Secretary Paul Wolfowitz to Secretary Shultz, Nov. 19, 1993, secret/nodis (declassified 1995). The censure offer was in Shultz's bilateral talks with Korean foreign minister Lee Won Kyong.
The Negotiating Track: The Kissinger proposal was authorized by President Nixon in National Security Decision Memorandum 25 1, Mar. 29, 1974, top secret/sensitive (declassified 1996), which also involved substitution of a U.S.-ROK Command for the UN Command and negotiation of a nonaggression pact between the two Koreas. It evidently was discussed by Kissinger with the Chinese in Mar. 1974, Oct. 1974, and Oct. 1975. See US-PRC Chronology, pp. 40,