The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [39]
Sneider saw two main alternatives to the existing policy: disengagement or the establishment of a new basis for durable partnership.
Habib, his predecessor as ambassador, was back in Washington on the receiving end of his cables as assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. Habib had observed at the time of Park's martial-law takeover in October 1972 that the process of U.S. disengagement from Korea had "already begun" and "should be accelerated." However, in the wake of the debacle in Vietnam, Sneider made the case that "disengagement, whether gradual or otherwise, is now far too risky as long as the North Korean posture remains militant; it would escalate the possibility of conflict and risks a breakdown of Japanese confidence in our treaty commitment." Perhaps as a gesture to the views of Habib, Sneider wrote, "Under different circumstances, a gradual disengagement could be worth serious consideration."
Sneider called his preferred and recommended alternative "durable partnership" with long-term guarantees for Korea, along the lines of the NATO and Japanese partnerships. He wrote, "The longer we stave off the inevitable decision as to whether our relationship, including our military presence, is temporary or durable, the more President Park and Kim 11 Sung will pursue their premises that it is in fact temporary, adding further to the instability on the Korean peninsula."
As he saw it, an improved relationship would involve such things as greater Washington-Seoul consultation, a transition from economic aid to private investment (which was already happening), and a higher priority for Korea on the U.S. negotiating agenda with China and the Soviet Union. However, the most important element he recommended was "a significant U.S. force presence with indefinite tenure ... publicly projected with major reductions linked to changes in the security situation in Northeast Asia and arrangements between North and South reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula."
In the aftermath of Vietnam, Washington was wary of openended commitments. President Gerald Ford, who had taken office in August 1974 after Nixon's forced resignation, had told Park during a brief visit to Seoul in November 1974 that "we have no intention of withdrawing U.S. personnel from Korea." However, this statement was interpreted by the Ford National Security Council staff as apply ing only to total withdrawals, not to partial withdrawals. Responding to the concern of Sneider and others about South Korean fears of a U.S. pullout during a visit to Seoul in August 1975, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger privately reassured Park that "he foresees no basic changes over the next five years" in the level of U.S. forces. But when this comment got back to the White House via a memorandum of the conversation, a National Security Council staff aide objected that Schlesinger had gone beyond administration policy.
In any case, it was obvious that Ford would face serious Democratic opposition the following year, which could bring about a change in the situation. Schlesinger told Park that "he expects President Ford to be reelected, but if not the Democrats are not likely to eliminate U.S. support for South Korea." Schlesinger may not have known or cared that Democrat Jimmy Carter, then considered a longshot contender for his party's presidential nomination, had already begun advocating the complete withdrawal of American ground troops from Korea.
With the election looming ahead, no new American relationship along the lines of Sneider's recommendation was instituted. Despite U.S. attempts at reassurance, Park continued to feel a deep sense of vulnerability. In mid-1975 he put three laws through the National Assembly that were intended to put the nation on a wartime footing: a tightened public security law, coming on top of the issuance of Emergency Decree Nine, which in effect banned all political criticism of the government; a civil defense law creating a paramilitary corps of all males between ages 17 and 50; and a new defense tax levied