The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [41]
India's nuclear test in 1974, the first by a developing nonaligned country, jolted the world awake to the dangers of the spread of nuclear weapons. Suddenly nuclear proliferation became a high-priority concern in Washington. U.S. intelligence officials began giving renewed scrutiny to import data on sensitive materials, and "when they got to Korea, everything snapped into place," an American analyst recalled years later. Based on these telltale hints, according to Paul Cleveland, who was political counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, "people were sent to work, and in a relatively short period of time developed absolute confirmation from clandestine sources" that South Korea was secretly embarked on a program to build the bomb.
In November 1974 the Embassy sent to Washington a highly classified intelligence assessment that South Korea "is proceeding with initial phases of a nuclear weapons development program." This kicked off an interagency intelligence study in Washington that concluded that the ROK could develop a limited nuclear weapon and delivery capability within ten years, but that its efforts to build a bomb would become known well before that time, with significant political impact on neighboring countries. A secret cable to the Embassy in Seoul from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, with the concurrence of the Ford White House, emphasized the gravity of the issue:
In the case of Korea our general [proliferation] concerns are intensified by its strategic location and by the impact which any Korean effort to establish nuclear capability would have on its neighbors, particularly North Korea and Japan. ROK possession of nuclear weapons would have major destabilizing effect in an area which not only Japan but USSR [Soviet Union], PRC [Peoples Republic of China] and ourselves are directly involved. It could lead to Soviet or Chinese assurances of nuclear weapons support to North Korea in event of conflict.... This impact will be complicated by fact that ROK nuclear weapon effort has been in part reflection of lessened ROKG [ROK government] confidence in U.S. security commitment, and consequent desire on Park's part to reduce his military dependence on U.S.
American policy as set forth in the secret instructions was "to discourage ROK effort in this area and to inhibit to the fullest possible extent any ROK development of a nuclear explosive capability or delivery system."
The administration decided on a multifaceted approach, using both direct U.S. pressure and the development of common policies with other nuclear supplier nations to inhibit South Korean access to nuclear weapons technology. The tough issue was how to accomplish this without a serious rift in the U.S.-ROK alliance, especially at a time when Korean confidence in the United States was plummeting due to the developments in Saigon.
Initially the emphasis was on indirect action to persuade France to revoke its offers of nuclear cooperation. U.S. ambassador Sneider cautioned the French ambassador in Seoul, Pierre Landy, that "the United States has no doubts that the Koreans have in mind putting to ulterior military ends what they can make use of such as plutonium." The French refused to give up their potential sales to Seoul, saying they would cancel their plans only if the Koreans asked them to do so.
South Korean officials denied they were embarked on a nuclear weapons program. Many of those who denied it probably didn't know the carefully hidden truth. "We have the capability," Park told columnist Robert Novak in early June 1975, but he denied that his government was using it. He added, in a plea for continuing U.S. support, "If the U.S. nuclear umbrella were to be removed, we have to start developing our nuclear capability to save ourselves." He said much the same thing in an interview with me several weeks later.
U.S. officials