The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [70]
The same day, Chun held his first meeting with Gleysteen, coming at the ambassador's invitation to the U.S. Embassy. In response to Gleysteen's plea for a return to constitutional order, Chun insisted that he supported President Choi, that the events of December 12 were an accidental outgrowth of his investigation of Park's assassination, and that he harbored no personal ambition. The purge of the army, which had resulted in Chun's unchallenged control of the most important levers of power, was a glaring contradiction of this claim. While recognizing his intelligence and drive, Gleysteen came to distrust Chun and eventually consider him "almost the definition of unreliability ... unscrupulous ... ruthless ... a liar." Gleysteen's successor as U.S. ambassador, Richard L. Walker, considered Chun "one of the shrewdest, most calculating, politically smart people I've known."
The events of December brought American officials face to face with the limited extent of their leverage on South Korean political developments. As in the 1961 military coup that brought Park to power, the military showdown of December 1979 was an accomplished fact before the United States was able to react. The U.S. Embassy had sought briefly but unsuccessfully to reverse the 1961 coup by announcing its continuing support of the elected government, but its effort was an embarrassing failure, a cautionary reminder to officials who came later. When a Korean academic urged Gleysteen through an American friend to "nullify what General Chun did and kick him out ... teach Koreans a lesson that the United States does not support just anyone," the ambassador rejected the idea out of hand. "Cannot act as a colonial governor," Gleysteen responded.
American officials in both Seoul and Washington, realizing it would be fruitless, made no effort at any time to undo what Gleysteen privately called Chun's "power grab." Gleysteen explicitly told Chun's military colleagues that "we are not trying to reverse the events of December 12." Instead, the United States pressed Chun to refrain from interfering with the Korean political process or taking political power in his own right, both of which he soon did in contravention of their advice.
No one could deny that the United States had important stakes in the future of South Korea, but by 1979 it was unclear how far Washington could go in shaping that future. American diplomats relied mainly on attempts at persuasion, telling Chun and his colleagues that their takeover threatened national security and economic growth, in which the United States had major interests. In arguments that were often repeated, Gleysteen told Chun in their initial meeting that "the [December 12] actions had set a dangerous precedent within the ROK military, run great risks in light of the North Korean threat, and raised further questions internally about the ability of the Choi government to sustain progress toward orderly political liberalization, and externally about the prospects for stability." Gleysteen went on to stress that "the ROK had to maintain a civilian government and could not afford to lose the support of the U.S. military and businessmen who were deeply disturbed by what had happened."
Chun received these arguments politely but was not swayed by them. He and his fellow generals believed they knew more about the North Korean threat than did the Americans, and they did not consider it an imminent danger. Indeed, in view of the recently proposed U.S. pullout, it was arguable how much danger the United States actually perceived from the North. As for the economic issues, the economy was still in trouble, exacerbated by uncertainty about the political future in Seoul; however, it was questionable whether U.S.