The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [79]
In a complete reversal of what the incoming administration viewed as Carter's wimpish attitude toward Korea, Reagan publicly assured Chun that the new adminstration had no plans to withdraw American troops-in fact, Reagan eventually increased the forces to 43,000 Americans, the largest number on duty in Korea since 1972 and 3,000 more than when Carter had begun his withdrawal program. The two presidents announced they would immediately resume the previously postponed military and economic consultations. Although not publicly announced, Reagan formally informed Chun in their White House conversation that the United States was prepared to sell Korea F-16 warplanes, the most modern in the U.S. inventory, an arrangement that had been agreed to in principle during the Carter administration, but which Carter personally prevented from coming to fruition. On hearing the news from Reagan, Chun immediately accepted.
Reagan's warm White House reception was a major turning point for Chun, convincing most South Koreans that his takeover was a fait accompli. By his actions, Reagan built a store of obligation and goodwill with Chun that he drew upon later in connection with other issues. He also left a store of bitter antagonism and a sense of betrayal among Koreans who had previously admired the United States but who now held it responsible for Chun's December 12 military coup, the bloody suppression of opposition in Kwangju, and the highprofile endorsement of Chun's rule.
How much Reagan understood-or cared-about the political situation in Seoul is doubtful. At the November 20 meeting of the outgoing and incoming American presidents, their only meeting during the postelection transition period, Carter thanked Reagan for sending a message to Chun urging that Kim Dae Jung's life be spared. Up to that point in the extensive briefing, the newly elected U.S. president had had nothing to say. Carter discussed such issues as control of nuclear weapons in times of crisis and a long list of foreign policy issues, from the Soviet Union and the Middle East to China. However, when Carter touched on Korea and the Kim case, Reagan suddenly exclaimed, "Mr. President, I'd like to have the power that Korean presidents have to draft dissenters." The outgoing chief executive, who had championed human rights in quarrels with South Korean presidents, was startled by his successor's comment.
TERROR AND TALK
amilies and friends of the passengers of Korean Air Lines flight 007 waited with growing apprehension at Seoul's Kimpo airport on the morning of September 1, 1983. The flight, which originated in New York and refueled in Alaska, had mysteriously disappeared from the skies overnight en route to Seoul. Within a few hours, American intelligence agencies pieced together radio intercepts that told the grisly story of the discovery, tracking, pursuit, and destruction of the civilian airliner by Soviet air defense forces as it strayed over Soviet territory north of Japan. Playing back the tapes of transmissions recorded during the night, officials at an American-Japanese listening post heard the chilling report of a Russian fighter pilot to his headquarters: "The target is destroyed."