The Two Koreas_ A Contemporary History - Don Oberdorfer [83]
The available evidence does not support the diversionary tactic theory, because the North continued to pursue its diplomatic initiative with even greater intensity in the months and indeed years after Rangoon. The second theory seems unlikely: From what is known about the highly centralized decision-making apparatus in Pyongyang, it is hardly credible that Kim II Sung and Kim Jong II were unaware of either the talks initiative or the plan to assassinate Chun. The most likely explanation is that the diplomacy toward the South and a standing order to assassinate Chun were on separate tracks in Pyongyang, with initiatives in both areas going forward without much consideration of the impact of the one on the other. On several later occasions as well, North Korean diplomatic initiatives were closely trailed by public statements warning against concessions. This suggests that departures from the hard line were controversial in leadership circles in Pyongyang.
The idea of three-way peace talks involving the United States as well as the two Koreas had been discussed in Washington in the spring of 1978 by two maverick communists close to Kim Il Sung, Yugoslavia's president, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, and Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu, in separate conversations with President Carter. The idea had received a big boost in connection with Carter's 1979 trip to Seoul, when President Park Chung Hee agreed to back the proposal despite the misgivings of nearly everyone else in his government. The South Koreans feared a repetition of the Paris talks on Vietnam, where the South Vietnamese had been overshadowed by Hanoi and Washington and relegated to a devastating secondary role.
At the beginning of the Reagan administration in 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig had rejected the idea of three-way talks and instructed the State Department to oppose them. However, a number of American diplomats did not agree, and the American Embassy in Beijing continued to promote the plan in discussions with the Chinese. Moreover, a U.S. demarche to North Korea through Beijing in September 1983 mentioned trilateral talks among a list of items that could improve relations with the United States.
North Korea's three-way-talks proposal in October 1983 was given much less credence than it otherwise would have had because of the Rangoon bombing the next day. Nonetheless, the following month, Reagan, addressing the South Korean National Assembly on a trip to the Far East, personally endorsed three-way talks, declaring that "we would, as we've often stressed, be willing to participate in discussions with North Korea in any forum in which the Republic of Korea is equally represented." According to then-Assistant Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz, the words were "boilerplate" and did not reflect actual administration thinking.
North Korea, however, took Reagan's words at face value, as was made clear in a speech by Politburo member and former foreign minister Ho Dam, who cited Reagan's remarks and proclaimed that Pyongyang's position had been taken "in full consideration of the long-maintained demand of the United States." North Korea continued to advance its proposal in December 1983, and in January 1984 it put it forth publicly in very high-level and high-profile fashion: During an official visit to Washington, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang brought it in writing to Reagan and Shultz at the White House. Hours after Zhao's presentation, North Korea broadcast the full text.
Once Pyongyang endorsed three-way talks, however, Washington rejected the very idea it had previously espoused. Reagan counterproposed, in discussions with Zhao, that peace talks on the peninsula should begin with North-South bilateral negotiations, and if that did not suffice, four-way talks that also involved China should begin. South Korea took the same position and also declared that Pyongyang must apologize for the Rangoon bombing before talks could begin. China seemed