The World in 2050_ Four Forces Shaping Civilization's Northern Future - Laurence C. Smith [141]
59 Allen J. Scott, Technopolis: High-Technology Industry and Regional Development in Southern California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 322 pp.
60 H. Ghesquiere, Singapore’s Success: Engineering Economic Growth (Singapore: Thomson Learning, 2007).
61 M. Gandy, “Planning, Anti-planning, and the Infrastructure Crisis Facing Metropolitan Lagos,” Urban Studies 43, no. 2 (2006): 371-396.
62 E. Alemika, I. Chukwuma, “Criminal Victimization and Fear of Crime in Lagos Metropolis, Nigeria,” CLEEN Foundation Monograph Series, no. 1, 2005.
63 J. Harnishfeger, “The Bakassi Boys: Fighting Crime in Nigeria,” Journal of Modern African Studies 41, no. 1 (2003): 23-49.
64 “The State of Human Rights in Nigeria, 2005-2006,” National Human Rights Commission, Nigeria, 2006, http://web.ng.undp.org/publications/governance/STATE_OF_HUMAN_RIGHTS_REPORT_IN_NIGERIA.pdf (accessed March 31, 2010). Note: The events described in this document were not independently verified.
65 P. 1, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World (Washington, D.C.: U.S. National Intelligence Council, 2008), 99 pp.
66 “Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050,” Global Economics Paper no 99, Goldman Sachs (2003), 24 pp. Other, more recent model studies yield comparable results.
67 E.g., from the global accounting giant PricewaterhouseCoopers, “The World in 2050: How Big Will the Major Emerging Market Economies Get and How Can the OECD Compete?” J. Hawksworth, Head of Macroeconomics, PWC (2006), 46 pp.; and the Japan Center for Economic Research, “Long-term Forecast of Global Economy and Population 2006-2050: Demographic change and the Asian Economy,” JCER (March 2007), 51 pp., and others.
68 These data are from the above econometric model study of the BRICs by Goldman Sachs. All figures in inflation-adjusted 2003 U.S. dollars, for years 2003 and 2050, Appendix II, Global Paper no. 99, Goldman Sachs (2003). Rather than simply extrapolating current growth rates, the model prescribes a set of clear assumptions capturing how growth and development work. Some of these—like continued financial and institutional stability, openness to trade, and education, for example—could certainly change with the choices of future political leaders. The extent to which the 2008-09 global economic collapse might delay these particular projections is unclear, but as of April 2010 these developing economies were recovering sharply (see next).
69 From 2007 to 2009, GDP grew 2.17%, 8.76%, 6.35% annually for Brazil, India, and China, respectively, and shrank -1.6%, -2.08%, and -3.07% in the U.S., Germany, and Japan. The revised Carnegie 2050 GDP projections are also from this study. U. Dadush and B. Stancil, “The G20 in 2050,” International Economic Bulletin, November 2009, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=24195 (accessed November 26, 2009).
70 “Brazil Takes Off,” The Economist 339, no. 8657 (November 12, 2009): 15.
71 Dadush and Stancil (2009).
72 The Goldman Sachs study projects Russia’s per capita income to rise to around USD $50,000 by 2050 (all figures in inflation-adjusted 2003 U.S. dollars).
73 India’s per capita income in 2010 was less than USD $1,000; it is projected to rise to around USD $17,000 by 2050 (all figures in inflation-adjusted 2003 U.S. dollars).
74 P. 99, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World (Washington, D.C.: U.S. National Intelligence Council, 2008), 99 pp.
75 William A. V. Clark, The California Cauldron: Immigration and the Fortunes of Local Communities (New York: The Guilford Press, 1998), 224 pp.
76 See note 15.
77 For a good example of how population momentum is playing out in Asia, see S. B. Westley, “A Snapshot of Populations in Asia,” Asia-Pacific Population & Policy 59 (2002).
78 0.55% per year in 2050, a global