THEAETETUS [13]
is to say, we see and know the figure and colour
of the letters, and we hear and know the elevation or depression of
the sound of them; but we do not perceive by sight and hearing, or
know, that which grammarians and interpreters teach about them.
Soc. Capital, Theaetetus; and about this there shall be no
dispute, because I want you to grow; but there is another difficulty
coming, which you will also have to repulse.
Theaet. What is it?
Soc. Some one will say, Can a man who has ever known anything, and
still has and preserves a memory of that which he knows, not know that
which he remembers at the time when he remembers? I have, I fear, a
tedious way of putting a simple question, which is only, whether a man
who has learned, and remembers, can fail to know?
Theaet. Impossible, Socrates; the supposition is monstrous.
Soc. Am I talking nonsense, then? Think: is not seeing perceiving,
and is not sight perception?
Theaet. True.
Soc. And if our recent definition holds, every man knows that
which he has seen?
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. And you would admit that there is such a thing as memory?
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. And is memory of something or of nothing?
Theaet. Of something, surely.
Soc. Of things learned and perceived, that is?
Theaet. Certainly.
Soc. Often a man remembers that which he has seen?
Theaet. True.
Soc. And if he closed his eyes, would he forget?
Theaet. Who, Socrates, would dare to say so?
Soc. But we must say so, if the previous argument is to be
maintained.
Theaet. What do you mean? I am not quite sure that I understand you,
though I have a strong suspicion that you are right.
Soc. As thus: he who sees knows, as we say, that which he sees;
for perception and sight and knowledge are admitted to be the same.
Theaet. Certainly.
Soc. But he who saw, and has knowledge of that which he saw,
remembers, when he closes his eyes, that which he no longer sees.
Theaet. True.
Soc. And seeing is knowing, and therefore not-seeing is not-knowing?
Theaet. Very true.
Soc. Then the inference is, that a man may have attained the
knowledge, of something, which he may remember and yet not know,
because he does not see; and this has been affirmed by us to be a
monstrous supposition.
Theaet. Most true.
Soc. Thus, then, the assertion that knowledge and perception are
one, involves a manifest impossibility?
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. Then they must be distinguished?
Theaet. I suppose that they must.
Soc. Once more we shall have to begin, and ask "What is
knowledge?" and yet, Theaetetus, what are we going to do?
Theaet. About what?
Soc. Like a good-for-nothing cock, without having won the victory,
we walk away from the argument and crow.
Theaet. How do you mean?
Soc. After the manner of disputers, we were satisfied with mere
verbal consistency, and were well pleased if in this way we could gain
an advantage. Although professing not to be mere Eristics, but
philosophers, I suspect that we have unconsciously fallen into the
error of that ingenious class of persons.
Theaet. I do not as yet understand you.
Soc. Then I will try to explain myself: just now we asked the
question, whether a man who had learned and remembered could fail to
know, and we showed that a person who had seen might remember when
he had his eyes shut and could not see, and then he would at the
same time remember and not know. But this was an impossibility. And so
the Protagorean fable came to nought, and yours also, who maintained
that knowledge is the same as perception.
Theaet. True.
Soc. And yet, my friend, I rather suspect that the result would have
been different if Protagoras, who was the father of the first of the
two-brats, had been alive; he would have had a great deal to say on
their behalf. But he is dead, and we insult over his orphan child; and
even the guardians whom he left, and of whom our friend Theodorus is
one, are unwilling to give any help,
of the letters, and we hear and know the elevation or depression of
the sound of them; but we do not perceive by sight and hearing, or
know, that which grammarians and interpreters teach about them.
Soc. Capital, Theaetetus; and about this there shall be no
dispute, because I want you to grow; but there is another difficulty
coming, which you will also have to repulse.
Theaet. What is it?
Soc. Some one will say, Can a man who has ever known anything, and
still has and preserves a memory of that which he knows, not know that
which he remembers at the time when he remembers? I have, I fear, a
tedious way of putting a simple question, which is only, whether a man
who has learned, and remembers, can fail to know?
Theaet. Impossible, Socrates; the supposition is monstrous.
Soc. Am I talking nonsense, then? Think: is not seeing perceiving,
and is not sight perception?
Theaet. True.
Soc. And if our recent definition holds, every man knows that
which he has seen?
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. And you would admit that there is such a thing as memory?
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. And is memory of something or of nothing?
Theaet. Of something, surely.
Soc. Of things learned and perceived, that is?
Theaet. Certainly.
Soc. Often a man remembers that which he has seen?
Theaet. True.
Soc. And if he closed his eyes, would he forget?
Theaet. Who, Socrates, would dare to say so?
Soc. But we must say so, if the previous argument is to be
maintained.
Theaet. What do you mean? I am not quite sure that I understand you,
though I have a strong suspicion that you are right.
Soc. As thus: he who sees knows, as we say, that which he sees;
for perception and sight and knowledge are admitted to be the same.
Theaet. Certainly.
Soc. But he who saw, and has knowledge of that which he saw,
remembers, when he closes his eyes, that which he no longer sees.
Theaet. True.
Soc. And seeing is knowing, and therefore not-seeing is not-knowing?
Theaet. Very true.
Soc. Then the inference is, that a man may have attained the
knowledge, of something, which he may remember and yet not know,
because he does not see; and this has been affirmed by us to be a
monstrous supposition.
Theaet. Most true.
Soc. Thus, then, the assertion that knowledge and perception are
one, involves a manifest impossibility?
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. Then they must be distinguished?
Theaet. I suppose that they must.
Soc. Once more we shall have to begin, and ask "What is
knowledge?" and yet, Theaetetus, what are we going to do?
Theaet. About what?
Soc. Like a good-for-nothing cock, without having won the victory,
we walk away from the argument and crow.
Theaet. How do you mean?
Soc. After the manner of disputers, we were satisfied with mere
verbal consistency, and were well pleased if in this way we could gain
an advantage. Although professing not to be mere Eristics, but
philosophers, I suspect that we have unconsciously fallen into the
error of that ingenious class of persons.
Theaet. I do not as yet understand you.
Soc. Then I will try to explain myself: just now we asked the
question, whether a man who had learned and remembered could fail to
know, and we showed that a person who had seen might remember when
he had his eyes shut and could not see, and then he would at the
same time remember and not know. But this was an impossibility. And so
the Protagorean fable came to nought, and yours also, who maintained
that knowledge is the same as perception.
Theaet. True.
Soc. And yet, my friend, I rather suspect that the result would have
been different if Protagoras, who was the father of the first of the
two-brats, had been alive; he would have had a great deal to say on
their behalf. But he is dead, and we insult over his orphan child; and
even the guardians whom he left, and of whom our friend Theodorus is
one, are unwilling to give any help,