THEAETETUS [35]
that the birds are kinds of knowledge, and
that when we were children, this receptacle was empty; whenever a
man has gotten and detained in the enclosure a kind of knowledge, he
may be said to have learned or discovered the thing which is the
subject of the knowledge: and this is to know.
Theaet. Granted.
Soc. And further, when any one wishes to catch any of these
knowledges or sciences, and having taken, to hold it, and again to let
them go, how will he express himself?-will he describe the
"catching" of them and the original "possession" in the same words?
I will make my meaning clearer by an example:-You admit that there
is an art of arithmetic?
Theaet. To be sure.
Soc. Conceive this under the form of a hunt after the science of odd
and even in general.
Theaet. I follow.
Soc. Having the use of the art, the arithmetician, if I am not
mistaken, has the conceptions of number under his hand, and can
transmit them to another.
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. And when transmitting them he may be said to teach them, and
when receiving to learn them, and when receiving to learn them, and
when having them in possession in the aforesaid aviary he may be
said to know them.
Theaet. Exactly.
Soc. Attend to what follows: must not the perfect arithmetician know
all numbers, for he has the science of all numbers in his mind?
Theaet. True.
Soc. And he can reckon abstract numbers in his head, or things about
him which are numerable?
Theaet. Of course he can.
Soc. And to reckon is simply to consider how much such and such a
number amounts to?
Theaet. Very true.
Soc. And so he appears to be searching into something which he
knows, as if he did not know it, for we have already admitted that
he knows all numbers;-you have heard these perplexing questions
raised?
Theaet. I have.
Soc. May we not pursue the image of the doves, and say that the
chase after knowledge is of two kinds? one kind is prior to possession
and for the sake of possession, and the other for the sake of taking
and holding in the hands that which is possessed already. And thus,
when a man has learned and known something long ago, he may resume and
get hold of the knowledge which he has long possessed, but has not
at hand in his mind.
Theaet. True.
Soc. That was my reason for asking how we ought to speak when an
arithmetician sets about numbering, or a grammarian about reading?
Shall we say, that although he knows, he comes back to himself to
learn what he already knows?
Theaet. It would be too absurd, Socrates.
Soc. Shall we say then that he is going to read or number what he
does not know, although we have admitted that he knows all letters and
all numbers?
Theaet. That, again, would be an absurdity.
Soc. Then shall we say that about names we care nothing?-any one may
twist and turn the words "knowing" and "learning" in any way which
he likes, but since we have determined that the possession of
knowledge is not the having or using it, we do assert that a man
cannot not possess that which he possesses; and, therefore, in no case
can a man not know that which he knows, but he may get a false opinion
about it; for he may have the knowledge, not of this particular thing,
but of some other;-when the various numbers and forms of knowledge are
flying about in the aviary, and wishing to capture a certain sort of
knowledge out of the general store, he takes the wrong one by mistake,
that is to say, when he thought eleven to be twelve, he got hold of
the ringdove which he had in his mind, when he wanted the pigeon.
Theaet. A very rational explanation.
Soc. But when he catches the one which he wants, then he is not
deceived, and has an opinion of what is, and thus false and true
opinion may exist, and the difficulties which were previously raised
disappear. I dare say that you agree with me, do you not?
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. And so we are rid of the difficulty of a man's not knowing what
he knows, for
that when we were children, this receptacle was empty; whenever a
man has gotten and detained in the enclosure a kind of knowledge, he
may be said to have learned or discovered the thing which is the
subject of the knowledge: and this is to know.
Theaet. Granted.
Soc. And further, when any one wishes to catch any of these
knowledges or sciences, and having taken, to hold it, and again to let
them go, how will he express himself?-will he describe the
"catching" of them and the original "possession" in the same words?
I will make my meaning clearer by an example:-You admit that there
is an art of arithmetic?
Theaet. To be sure.
Soc. Conceive this under the form of a hunt after the science of odd
and even in general.
Theaet. I follow.
Soc. Having the use of the art, the arithmetician, if I am not
mistaken, has the conceptions of number under his hand, and can
transmit them to another.
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. And when transmitting them he may be said to teach them, and
when receiving to learn them, and when receiving to learn them, and
when having them in possession in the aforesaid aviary he may be
said to know them.
Theaet. Exactly.
Soc. Attend to what follows: must not the perfect arithmetician know
all numbers, for he has the science of all numbers in his mind?
Theaet. True.
Soc. And he can reckon abstract numbers in his head, or things about
him which are numerable?
Theaet. Of course he can.
Soc. And to reckon is simply to consider how much such and such a
number amounts to?
Theaet. Very true.
Soc. And so he appears to be searching into something which he
knows, as if he did not know it, for we have already admitted that
he knows all numbers;-you have heard these perplexing questions
raised?
Theaet. I have.
Soc. May we not pursue the image of the doves, and say that the
chase after knowledge is of two kinds? one kind is prior to possession
and for the sake of possession, and the other for the sake of taking
and holding in the hands that which is possessed already. And thus,
when a man has learned and known something long ago, he may resume and
get hold of the knowledge which he has long possessed, but has not
at hand in his mind.
Theaet. True.
Soc. That was my reason for asking how we ought to speak when an
arithmetician sets about numbering, or a grammarian about reading?
Shall we say, that although he knows, he comes back to himself to
learn what he already knows?
Theaet. It would be too absurd, Socrates.
Soc. Shall we say then that he is going to read or number what he
does not know, although we have admitted that he knows all letters and
all numbers?
Theaet. That, again, would be an absurdity.
Soc. Then shall we say that about names we care nothing?-any one may
twist and turn the words "knowing" and "learning" in any way which
he likes, but since we have determined that the possession of
knowledge is not the having or using it, we do assert that a man
cannot not possess that which he possesses; and, therefore, in no case
can a man not know that which he knows, but he may get a false opinion
about it; for he may have the knowledge, not of this particular thing,
but of some other;-when the various numbers and forms of knowledge are
flying about in the aviary, and wishing to capture a certain sort of
knowledge out of the general store, he takes the wrong one by mistake,
that is to say, when he thought eleven to be twelve, he got hold of
the ringdove which he had in his mind, when he wanted the pigeon.
Theaet. A very rational explanation.
Soc. But when he catches the one which he wants, then he is not
deceived, and has an opinion of what is, and thus false and true
opinion may exist, and the difficulties which were previously raised
disappear. I dare say that you agree with me, do you not?
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. And so we are rid of the difficulty of a man's not knowing what
he knows, for