THEAETETUS [40]
Soc. If, then, a syllable is a whole, and has many parts or letters,
the letters as well as the syllable must be intelligible and
expressible, since all the parts are acknowledged to be the same as
the whole?
Theaet. True.
Soc. But if it be one and indivisible, then the syllables and the
letters are alike undefined and unknown, and for the same reason?
Theaet. I cannot deny that.
Soc. We cannot, therefore, agree in the opinion of him who says that
the syllable can be known and expressed, but not the letters.
Theaet. Certainly not; if we may trust the argument.
Soc. Well, but will you not be equally inclined to, disagree with
him, when you remember your own experience in learning to read?
Theaet. What experience?
Soc. Why, that in learning you were kept trying to distinguish the
separate letters both by the eye and by the car, in order that, when
you heard them spoken or saw them written, you might not be confused
by their position.
Theaet. Very true.
Soc. And is the education of the harp-player complete unless he
can tell what string answers to a particular note; the notes, as every
one would allow, are the elements or letters of music?
Theaet. Exactly.
Soc. Then, if we argue from the letters and syllables which we
know to other simples and compounds, we shall say that the letters
or simple clements as a class are much more certainly known than the
syllables, and much more indispensable to a perfect knowledge of any
subject; and if some one says that the syllable is known and the
letter unknown, we shall consider that either intentionally or
unintentionally he is talking nonsense?
Theaet. Exactly.
Soc. And there might be given other proofs of this belief, if I am
not mistaken. But do not let us in looking for them lose sight of
the question before us, which is the meaning of the statement, that
right opinion with rational definition or explanation is the most
perfect form of knowledge.
Theaet. We must not.
Soc. Well, and what is the meaning of the term "explanation"? I
think that we have a choice of three meanings.
Theaet. What are they?
Soc. In the first place, the meaning may be, manifesting one's
thought by the voice with verbs and nouns, imaging an opinion in the
stream which flows from the lips, as in a mirror or water. Does not
explanation appear to be of this nature?
Theaet. Certainly; he who so manifests his thought, is said to
explain himself.
Soc. And every one who is not born deaf or dumb is able sooner or
later to manifest what he thinks of anything; and if so, all those who
have a right opinion about anything will also have right
explanation; nor will right opinion be anywhere found to exist apart
from knowledge.
Theaet. True.
Soc. Let us not, therefore, hastily charge him who gave this account
of knowledge with uttering an unmeaning word; for perhaps he only
intended to say, that when a person was asked what was the nature of
anything, he should be able to answer his questioner by giving the
clements of the thing.
Theaet. As for example, Socrates...?
Soc. As, for example, when Hesiod says that a waggon is made up of a
hundred planks. Now, neither you nor I could describe all of them
individually; but if any one asked what is a waggon, we should be
content to answer, that a waggon consists of wheels, axle, body, rims,
yoke.
Theaet. Certainly.
Soc. And our opponent will probably laugh at us, just as he would if
we professed to be grammarians and to give a grammatical account of
the name of Theaetetus, and yet could only tell the syllables and
not the letters of your name-that would be true opinion, and not
knowledge; for knowledge, as has been already remarked, is not
attained until, combined with true opinion, there is an enumeration of
the elements out of which is composed.
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. In the same general way, we might also have true opinion
about a waggon; but he who can describe its essence by an