Then They Came for Me_ A Family's Story of Love, Captivity, and Survival - Maziar Bahari [140]
No one can answer these questions. But many officials in Iran have realized that the situation has become unsustainable, so they’ve implicitly tried to distance themselves from Khamenei. Even Ahmadinejad, who became president only because of Khamenei’s support, is now trying ever so discreetly to dissociate himself from his master before it is too late. Since his reelection in 2009, Ahmadinejad and his gang, including some members of the Guards, have expanded their Mafia-like grip on power by replacing more moderate supporters of Khamenei with their own, while presenting themselves as an alternative to the clerical establishment.
The next phase of infighting in Iran will be a clash between conservative supporters of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad’s hard-line, Mafia-like supporters. The main difference between the two groups is their revolutionary backgrounds. The conservatives are generally people who either fought themselves during the revolution or belong to families that rose to prominence in the government or the Guards. The hard-liners are low-ranking members of the Guards or junior officials from those years. The main point of contention between the two groups is less ideological and has simply to do with their desire to be in power, and in charge of spending the nation’s significant oil revenue. Many Iranians dismiss the differences by saying that “conservatives ruined the country for three decades and now it is the hard-liners’ turn to finish the job!” Both groups despise the reformists and have their own supporters within the Guards.
The number of Guards supporting different factions is not clear, but the general understanding is that many Guards commanders look at Ahmadinejad’s policies and actions with suspicion, and in case of any possible future clash between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, they will support their master, Khamenei.
Ahmadinejad and his people know this and have been very careful not to voice any explicit criticism of Khamenei. But they have been developing a long-term plan that involves undermining Khamenei and the clerical establishment by manipulating Iranians’ nationalist sentiments, which has traditionally been the best way to stay in power. They challenge the regime’s policy of emphasizing Iranians’ Shia identity by putting forward new theories about “Iranian Islam.” They glorify ancient Iranian traditions, claiming that Islam as a religion has benefited from Iranian culture. The hard-liners refer to conservatives as reactionaries, calling them out of touch with the modern world. If this new brand of nationalism were presented by a group of scholars, it would be worthy of an academic debate, but as presented by a group of thugs with little knowledge of the religion who have shown very little respect for the people of Iran, these revisionist theories can only be seen as a political ploy to remain in power.
The infighting within his regime has put Khamenei in a difficult position. He has chastised individual members of Ahmadinejad’s cabal, while continuing to tolerate them and support Ahmadinejad’s presidency, if only to take every opportunity to maintain an image of a unity among his people. Khamenei should look at his supporters’ infighting with worry. Before the fall, every dictator’s supporters bicker with one another first, then eventually turn against their master.
In order to prolong his reign, Khamenei is bestowing more power to the Guards and transforming the Islamic Republic into a military dictatorship. Recently, retired Revolutionary Guards have been filling many official posts and entering the parliament, and they are taking over Iranian industry as much as they can. Almost every day we hear that the Guards have won a lucrative contract to build a road, pipeline, or refinery by pushing aside the