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During Khatami’s presidency, the United States and its allies invade Afghanistan and Iraq. Khatami advocates a dialogue among civilizations, but his attempts to improve Iran’s relations with the United States are sabotaged by Khamenei’s supporters. Iranian hard-liners think that resuming relations with the States will undermine their positions; at the same time, American neoconservatives promote a regime change in Iran. They believe that after what they see as their successes in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran can be contained or even dominated militarily by the United States. In his State of the Union speech in January 2002, President George W. Bush calls Iran part of an “axis of evil,” along with North Korea and Iraq.

A combination of diplomatic ineffectiveness, the poor economy, and the failure to realize a civil society leads to the demise of the reformist movement. Yet the eight years of Khatami’s relatively democratic and open-minded style of governance and cultural policies change Iran forever and make ordinary Iranians more aware of their rights as citizens.

Khatami’s tenure also makes the hard-liners more determined to do their utmost to stop reformists from ever again coming to power.

2005: AHMADINEJAD’S ELECTION

In June 2005, former president Rafsanjani; former speaker of the Majlis Mehdi Karroubi; a former Revolutionary Guards commander, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf; Tehran’s mayor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; and three other candidates compete in a tight race for the presidency of the Islamic Republic.

The continuation of the reformist movement in Iran means a more accountable government, which will limit Khamenei’s reign. In the sixteen years since he has become the supreme leader, Khamenei has not been able to establish an absolute rule because of Rafsanjani’s prominence for the first eight years and Khatami’s pro-reform policies for the next two terms. Khamenei needs a subservient president who will listen to him, and Khamenei’s followers need one of their own in office to guarantee their survival.

Prior to the June 2005 election, the main question is: Who will Khamenei support during the campaign? Karroubi, a tribal leader from the western province of Lorestan, has been a maverick in the parliament and is too close to the reformists. The repeat of Rafsanjani’s presidency would mean that Khamenei has to work with a president whose revolutionary background and political prominence equal or even exceed his own. Khamenei’s first choice is Ghalibaf, who has been a Khamenei devotee for years and who, during the 1999 student demonstrations, signed a letter, along with twenty-three other Guards commanders, accusing Mohammad Khatami of throwing the Islamic Republic into anarchy. But during his campaign, Ghalibaf avoids using pro-Khamenei ideological rhetoric. He dons a fashionable white suit instead of a military uniform and portrays himself as a modern independent leader. He famously says that he wants to be “an Islamic Reza Khan.”

In the meantime, the fringe candidate Ahmadinejad chastises others for forgetting the ideals of the revolution and being corrupted by money and power. A former Revolutionary Guard, Ahmadinejad promises to clean Iran of corruption and make Iranians more prosperous. Unlike other candidates who spend lavishly on their campaigns and make well-produced films, Ahmadinejad opts for face-to-face campaigning and produces a low-budget documentary about his simple life and achievements. A month before the election, it is obvious that Ahmadinejad has the support of the majority of poor and disenfranchised Khamenei supporters.

A few weeks before the election, many members of the Basij (pro-government volunteers) and the Guards are told by their commanders that Ahmadinejad is the leader’s choice for president. No candidate wins the clear majority in the first round of votes. The top two candidates are Rafsanjani, with 21.13 percent of the votes, and Ahmadinejad, with 19.43 percent.

In a letter to Khamenei, Mehdi Karroubi, who is third, with 17.24