Then They Came for Me_ A Family's Story of Love, Captivity, and Survival - Maziar Bahari [24]
If elected, Mousavi would not be able to stop the Guards, but a transparent government, which he was promising to create, would no doubt interfere with the Guards’ control of Iran’s politics and economy.
Amir told me that after the 2005 election, one of the commanders of the Guards had asked that Amir and all his close associates be removed from the Ministry of Interior. “He knew that my team would never accept tampering with people’s votes,” Amir said. “So they fired all of us.”
The current Minister of Interior, Sadegh Mahsouli, took the cake when it came to corruption. A Guards commander in the 1980s, he had forced many people to sell their houses to him at a fraction of what they were worth. He and his Guards buddies then demolished those houses and built high-rises on the properties. Mahsouli had also taken millions of dollars in bribes from Kurdish and Shia Iraqi refugees who were forced, by Saddam Hussein’s government, to move to Iran in 1991, during the First Gulf War.
In March 2008, when Mahsouli was appointed minister, I decided to write an article about him, but after a few interviews, Amir warned me that I should be very careful about publishing my findings. “The Guards have become like a mafia,” he said at the time, looking me in the eye. “They have taken over the country and can easily eliminate you if they wish.”
I remembered Amir’s warning from more than a year ago as I watched him now, holding his chin with one hand and tapping nervously on his desk with the other. The sun was shining through the blinds, creating ominous lines on Amir’s face; he looked as if he were behind bars. “With Mahsouli in charge of the elections, I’m beginning to fear that Ahmadinejad has almost guaranteed his reelection,” Amir said. “They have done their best to manipulate the public before the elections, and now they’re frightened that their plans may not work. Mahsouli is exploring different ways to rig the votes.”
Although Amir opposed everything Khamenei stood for, he had several photos of himself and Khamenei on his desk at home. In one of the photographs, Amir was sitting next to Khamenei as he lay in a hospital bed.
Once, Amir saw me looking at the pictures.
“I’ve known Mr. Khamenei for more than forty years,” he said, taking the first photograph in his hand and cleaning the wooden frame with his index finger. “After the assassination attempt against him in June 1981, his right hand was paralyzed and he almost lost his life. Mr. Khamenei was like a brother to me then, and I visited him all the time in the hospital. You know, Maziar, he is a cultured man. He’s been reading a novel every week since I’ve known him. He’s a poet and likes traditional Iranian music. I don’t think he was so interested in power when he was made supreme leader in 1989.” Amir paused and picked up another photo. In it, Khamenei, Amir, and a group of other Islamic Republic officials were sitting on their knees in a circle around Ruhollah Khomeini. It didn’t look like a government meeting; it was more like a saint giving an audience to the faithful. “Leadership of the Islamic Republic was a cloak that fit Imam Khomeini,” Amir noted. “It looks too big on Mr. Khamenei. But power is even more addictive than heroin, and Mr. Khamenei is hooked on it now.”
Back in the office, Amir’s cell phone rang. He had to join Mousavi and a group of his advisers for evening prayers. “Amir jaan,” I said as I stood to leave. “You’re telling me Mousavi will win for sure but they are going to change the results?”
Amir held my hand in his. “The only chance of having a fair election is if Mr. Khamenei prevents the Ahmadinejad gang and the Guards’ intelligence unit from rigging the votes. All we can