Theodore Rex - Edmund Morris [258]
At one o’clock the following afternoon, a triumphant Roosevelt received Ray Stannard Baker at his daily shaving levée. Invitations to this ritual were coveted in Washington, and Baker was particularly flattered to find no other guests in attendance.
“How are you, Baker? I haven’t seen you since our correspondence in November.”
The President unclipped his pince-nez and sat down in a light chair that seemed threatened by his bulk. The barber applied a layer of lather while Roosevelt launched straight into an analysis of the Hepburn Bill. Baker, who had heard reports that Roosevelt was wavering on some clauses provocative to the Senate, was surprised how determined he was to give the ICC power over disputed rates.
Roosevelt recognized that for “the railroad Senators,” the great question was going to be over the role of courts in regulation—whether they should judge only the fairness of the ICC’s rates, or (as Elkins preferred) judge the actual disputes. He said that he and Attorney General Moody stood together in holding that the bill should say nothing specific about jurisdictional limits. Each court should be allowed “to find—as it were—its own level.” Taft and Philander Knox were both in favor of strict language.
Baker discovered, as Steffens had before him, that the only time to interrupt Roosevelt à toilette was when the razor made further loquacity perilous. He waited until the presidential chin was being scraped before venturing that the railroad bill was “the most important” Roosevelt could ever claim credit for.
“Yes, but not the most important administrative action. That was Panama.”
Since being out-maneuvered by Roosevelt in the summer of 1903, Baker had learned how to keep a presidential interview on track. He suggested that the Hepburn Bill was “only a first step.” It could not accomplish all the American people wanted; they would surely ask for more.
Roosevelt’s head began to swivel in protest. The barber had to match strokes with his gyrations.
“If this is a first step, where do you think we are going?”
“You may not agree with me, Mr. President, but I believe that we cannot stop short of governmental ownership of the railroads.”
Roosevelt became vehement. He said that he knew, better than anyone else, how “inefficient and undependable” federal employees were. It would be “a disaster” to have them in charge of free enterprises.
Waiting for another razor opportunity, Baker reported that he had just been in Kansas, where there was much social discontent. “The people out there are getting beyond you on these questions.”
“Here is the thing you must bear in mind,” Roosevelt said, clearly irritated. “I do not represent public opinion: I represent the public. There is a wide difference between the two, between the real interests of the public, and the public’s opinion of these interests. I must represent not the excited opinion of the West, but the real interests of the whole people.”
Even as he spoke, the Hepburn Bill was being considered by the Elkins Committee. Its basic provisions were the same as those Roosevelt and Dolliver had hammered out the previous December. The ICC would be authorized to set reasonable rates, whenever rates were justifiably challenged; railroads would have thirty days to appeal such decisions in court; private car lines were, for the first time, placed under ICC control; and all of them would have to adopt a uniform and open system of bookkeeping.
Baker and Lincoln Steffens, not being practical politicians, were disappointed in the Hepburn Bill, and Roosevelt had patiently to tolerate their complaints. But the bill was already too strong