Theodore Rex - Edmund Morris [263]
Austria was now backing Germany at Algeciras, while Britain sided with France. As the confrontation worsened, both camps turned to Roosevelt to bring about another successful mediation. Jusserand and Speck von Sternburg plagued him with warnings and cajolements. He resisted them as he could. They did not seem to understand, or care, that he was more interested in trying to figure out why Senator Knox had so tersely rejected his offer of an appointment to the Supreme Court. (Justice Brown had resigned at the beginning of March; now Taft was considering the position.)
Unwilling as he was to intervene over White’s head, Roosevelt saw a definite if distant threat looming at Algeciras. He suspected that what the Kaiser really wanted was “the partition of Morocco”—followed by the establishment of a German or German-friendly port, too far west for American comfort. Von Sternburg was reminded that the conference would never have taken place if Wilhelm had not begged the United States to push for it, nine months before. As a return favor, Roosevelt suggested, His Majesty might consider fashioning a compromise out of existing proposals. The policing issue could be solved if Germany accepted a Moorish force in all ports, commanded by French and Spanish “instructing officers.” The force would be paid for by all conferees, and France and Spain would unequivocally declare an open door to all Morocco.
In a letter of unusual frankness, Roosevelt told the Kaiser that though Germany would not get the multinational police it wanted, France was going to have to accept a considerable reduction of its current authority in Tangier.
If the conference should fail because of Germany’s insisting upon pressing France beyond the measure of concession described in this proposed arrangement … Germany would lose that increase of credit and moral power that the making of this arrangement would secure to her, and might be held responsible, probably far beyond the limits of reason, for all the evils that may come in the train of a disturbed condition of affairs in Europe.
Wilhelm responded by translating this proposal—with variations minor and not so minor—into German for Austria’s benefit, then retranslating it into English as a proposal of his own. Roosevelt was reminded, as so often in his presidency, of Tweedledum’s need to trump Tweedledee, and decided not to accept it. He told von Sternburg that he suspected Germany really did want a war with France. If so, the Kaiser would have to live with the consequences, and a severe decline in American goodwill.
Secretary Root added his own grave opinion, which the Ambassador cabled to the Wilhelmstrasse: that Germany’s conduct at the conference was “paltry and unworthy of a great power.”
On 19 March, White cabled that yet another proposal, described as “Austrian” but more largely the President’s own, had been laid on the table at Algeciras. Again with feelings of déjà vu, Roosevelt allowed Wilhelm to retreat in glory. “Communicate to His Majesty,” he instructed Speck von Sternburg, “my sincerest felicitation on this epochmaking political success at Algeciras. The policy of His Majesty on the Morocco question has been masterly from beginning to end.”
THE ARTICLE IN The Cosmopolitan that had so exercised Roosevelt’s wrath was a portrait of Senator Aldrich as “The Head of It All.” If that muck-spattered gentleman was grateful to him for returning the attack, there was no apparent lessening of Old Guard opposition to the railroad rate bill in the last days of March. Twenty-four implacable conservatives stood pat between Roosevelt and regulation. Many lesser items of presidential legislation, such as a statehood bill for Arizona and New Mexico and a tariff bill for the Philippines, were held up too, while in the House, Speaker Cannon had emerged as an eloquent spokesman for impure food. Sir Mortimer Durand revised his recent positive predictions. “At the present moment it seems as if the session were likely to close with a series of