Theodore Rex - Edmund Morris [61]
Amid mounting cries of revulsion, the President swung into action. He met with his Cabinet on 15 April, and demanded a full briefing on the Philippine situation. Root said defensively that one officer accused of water torture had been ordered to report for trial. Roosevelt was not satisfied. His entire insular policy was in danger, not to mention his reputation for decent governance. He directed Root to flash a cable to Major General Adna Chaffee, Commander of the Philippines Army:
THE PRESIDENT DESIRES TO KNOW IN THE FULLEST AND MOST CIRCUMSTANTIAL MANNER ALL THE FACTS.… FOR THE VERY REASON THAT THE PRESIDENT INTENDS TO BACK UP THE ARMY IN THE HEARTIEST FASHION IN EVERY LAWFUL AND LEGITIMATE METHOD OF DOING ITS WORK, HE ALSO INTENDS TO SEE THAT THE MOST VIGOROUS CARE IS EXERCISED TO DETECT AND PREVENT ANY CRUELTY OR BRUTALITY, AND THAT MEN WHO ARE GUILTY THEREOF ARE PUNISHED. GREAT AS THE PROVOCATION HAS BEEN IN DEALING WITH FOES WHO HABITUALLY RESORT TO TREACHERY MURDER AND TORTURE AGAINST OUR MEN, NOTHING CAN JUSTIFY OR WILL BE HELD TO JUSTIFY THE USE OF TORTURE OR INHUMAN CONDUCT OF ANY KIND ON THE PART OF THE AMERICAN ARMY.
Roosevelt also ordered the court-martial of General Smith, “under conditions which will give me the right of review.” These gestures, which coincided with the surrender of Miguel Malvar, the last uncaptured Filipino guerrilla leader, relieved pressure on the White House, if not the War Department. Tired and depressed, the Secretary sailed for a working vacation in Cuba.
CALLS FOR ROOT’S resignation followed him across the water. When General Smith admitted, on 25 April, to having authorized the slaughter of Filipino boys, even loyal Republicans were revolted. “It is almost incredible,” the Philadelphia Press commented, “that an American officer of any rank could have issued an order so shameful, inhuman, and barbarous.” Root was accused of a cover-up, or at least a reluctance to prosecute Army cruelty. “If we are to ‘benevolently assimilate’ Filipinos by such methods,” remarked the New Orleans Times-Democrat, “we should frankly so state, and drop our canting hypocrisy about having to wage war on these people for their own betterment.”
Roosevelt again made no effort to help his beleaguered Secretary. Relations between them had been strained since the Northern Securities suit. Root’s mood was not improved by his awareness that the President had known at least “the essence” of General Smith’s murderous policies for four months. Their tacit understanding had been that commanders such as Smith should be allowed to end the war quickly, with not too many questions asked.
Like all conservatives, Root disliked being called a reactionary. He sought to build policy on “good and essential” truths, historically tested. One such truth was that democracy had not succeeded in Asia—except, after a fashion, among the sophisticated Japanese. Most Filipinos were “but little advanced from pure savagery.” For every case of water torture the anti-imperialists might name, he could cite instances where American boys had been mutilated and burned alive—sometimes after honoring a white flag. One could no more trust than treat with the insurrectos; they were “Chinese” in their obtuseness. Miguel Malvar’s surrender document stated that all his people wanted was “independence under a protectorate.” This pathetic desire to be both liberated and looked after suggested that Kipling had been right about the White Man’s Burden. America had a moral duty toward her “new-caught sullen peoples, half-devil and half-child.” They had been taught the harsh discipline of war, and must now adapt to the milder discipline of civil government.
In formulating his attitude toward Filipinos, Root relied on the dispatches of William Howard Taft. The Governor was a convert to the “moral mandate” philosophy. When first sent to the archipelago in 1900, he had been an anti-imperialist. Massive, patient, capable, radiating goodwill,