They Were Divided - Miklos Banffy [96]
In those days the Casino Club was always being used for such meetings because anyone who was a member could go in and out without anyone else wondering what they were doing there and, furthermore, since those who were not members were permitted to use one of the restaurant rooms on the ground floor, anyone could be seen coming in without the press guessing that something was up and broadcasting the news to the general public.
Everyone realized the news must be exceptionally important; it was known that Count Berchtold, Austria’s foreign minister since the death of Aehrenthal a few months before, was also coming from Vienna and would see Khuen-Hedervary that night.
And very important it was – sudden, unexpected, serious and astonishing. It was also alarming and seemed fraught with danger. It was simply that at the previous day’s audience, Franz-Josef had instructed Khuen-Hedervary to inform the political leaders of Hungary that after more than half a century on the throne he was seriously considering abdication. He had informed the Minister-President that ever since 1867 he had faithfully and honestly respected the agreement drawn up in that year between the governments of Austria and Hungary, that he had done everything he could to humour the leaders of Hungary, always promoting Hungarian interests and honouring that country’s great families and now, or so it seemed to him, it was the descendants of those very people who had turned away from him and left it to him alone to preserve the terms of that agreement.
‘In these circumstances,’ the monarch had continued, ‘we authorize you to explain confidentially to your colleagues that if the Party of 1867 now in power decides to ally themselves with those who wish to erode our most important governing powers, then we are ready to abdicate at once and hand the throne over to our successor!’ He had then added, with conscious irony: ‘Then they’ll see what they are in for!’
The King’s words were a direct reference to the proposal put forward by Ferenc Kossuth which, if accepted, would have put an end to the Commander-in-Chief’s right to mobilize the reserves should the politicians’ obstructive tactics prevent the annual recruiting law being passed in Parliament. This proposal, after much debate, had been accepted not only by Andrassy, but also, and most unexpectedly, by Tisza and by Khuen-Hedervary himself – in other words by the majority of the 1867 Party. The reason was that the opposition’s obstruction of the passing of the defence estimates had already kept going since the previous July, and Kossuth had made it clear that acceptance of his terms was the price that had to be paid if the obstruction was to come to an end.
Tisza and Khuen-Hedervary had been almost alone in realizing that, in the present deteriorating situation in Europe, the primary consideration must be the building up of the armed forces. Tisza also did not think the diminution of the Commander-in-Chief’s prerogatives – which in any case he had planned to bring about in due course – anything like as important as bringing to an end the stalemate in Parliament. For them both the over-riding priority was to modernize the army.
Since the previous July the European situation had grown worse and worse.
The revolt in Albania had spread alarmingly. The rebels had been joined by several more tribes and even by officers from the Sultan’s army. Everywhere Turks were being assassinated and the government in Istanbul had ordered up reinforcements to control the borders with Montenegro. Nikita had at once replied by mobilizing the Montenegrin