TIMAEU [19]
as possible; or as those who wish to
impress figures on soft substances do not allow any previous
impression to remain, but begin by making the surface as even and
smooth as possible. In the same way that which is to receive
perpetually and through its whole extent the resemblances of all
eternal beings ought to be devoid of any particular form. Wherefore,
the mother and receptacle of all created and visible and in any way
sensible things, is not to be termed earth, or air, or fire, or water,
or any of their compounds or any of the elements from which these
are derived, but is an invisible and formless being which receives all
things and in some mysterious way partakes of the intelligible, and is
most incomprehensible. In saying this we shall not be far wrong; as
far, however, as we can attain to a knowledge of her from the previous
considerations, we may truly say that fire is that part of her
nature which from time to time is inflamed, and water that which is
moistened, and that the mother substance becomes earth and air, in
so far as she receives the impressions of them.
Let us consider this question more precisely. Is there any
self-existent fire? and do all those things which we call
self-existent exist? or are only those things which we see, or in some
way perceive through the bodily organs, truly existent, and nothing
whatever besides them? And is all that which, we call an
intelligible essence nothing at all, and only a name? Here is a
question which we must not leave unexamined or undetermined, nor
must we affirm too confidently that there can be no decision;
neither must we interpolate in our present long discourse a digression
equally long, but if it is possible to set forth a great principle
in a few words, that is just what we want.
Thus I state my view:-If mind and true opinion are two distinct
classes, then I say that there certainly are these self-existent ideas
unperceived by sense, and apprehended only by the mind; if, however,
as some say, true opinion differs in no respect from mind, then
everything that we perceive through the body is to be regarded as most
real and certain. But we must affirm that to be distinct, for they
have a distinct origin and are of a different nature; the one is
implanted in us by instruction, the other by persuasion; the one is
always accompanied by true reason, the other is without reason; the
one cannot be overcome by persuasion, but the other can: and lastly,
every man may be said to share in true opinion, but mind is the
attribute of the gods and of very few men. Wherefore also we must
acknowledge that there is one kind of being which is always the
same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into
itself from without, nor itself going out to any other, but
invisible and imperceptible by any sense, and of which the
contemplation is granted to intelligence only. And there is another
nature of the same name with it, and like to it, perceived by sense,
created, always in motion, becoming in place and again vanishing out
of place, which is apprehended by opinion and sense. And there is a
third nature, which is space, and is eternal, and admits not of
destruction and provides a home for all created things, and is
apprehended without the help of sense, by a kind of spurious reason,
and is hardly real; which we beholding as in a dream, say of all
existence that it must of necessity be in some place and occupy a
space, but that what is neither in heaven nor in earth has no
existence. Of these and other things of the same kind, relating to the
true and waking reality of nature, we have only this dreamlike
sense, and we are unable to cast off sleep and determine the truth
about them. For an image, since the reality, after which it is
modelled, does not belong to it, and it exists ever as the fleeting
shadow of some other, must be inferred to be in another [i.e. in space
], grasping existence in some way or other, or it could not be at all.
But
impress figures on soft substances do not allow any previous
impression to remain, but begin by making the surface as even and
smooth as possible. In the same way that which is to receive
perpetually and through its whole extent the resemblances of all
eternal beings ought to be devoid of any particular form. Wherefore,
the mother and receptacle of all created and visible and in any way
sensible things, is not to be termed earth, or air, or fire, or water,
or any of their compounds or any of the elements from which these
are derived, but is an invisible and formless being which receives all
things and in some mysterious way partakes of the intelligible, and is
most incomprehensible. In saying this we shall not be far wrong; as
far, however, as we can attain to a knowledge of her from the previous
considerations, we may truly say that fire is that part of her
nature which from time to time is inflamed, and water that which is
moistened, and that the mother substance becomes earth and air, in
so far as she receives the impressions of them.
Let us consider this question more precisely. Is there any
self-existent fire? and do all those things which we call
self-existent exist? or are only those things which we see, or in some
way perceive through the bodily organs, truly existent, and nothing
whatever besides them? And is all that which, we call an
intelligible essence nothing at all, and only a name? Here is a
question which we must not leave unexamined or undetermined, nor
must we affirm too confidently that there can be no decision;
neither must we interpolate in our present long discourse a digression
equally long, but if it is possible to set forth a great principle
in a few words, that is just what we want.
Thus I state my view:-If mind and true opinion are two distinct
classes, then I say that there certainly are these self-existent ideas
unperceived by sense, and apprehended only by the mind; if, however,
as some say, true opinion differs in no respect from mind, then
everything that we perceive through the body is to be regarded as most
real and certain. But we must affirm that to be distinct, for they
have a distinct origin and are of a different nature; the one is
implanted in us by instruction, the other by persuasion; the one is
always accompanied by true reason, the other is without reason; the
one cannot be overcome by persuasion, but the other can: and lastly,
every man may be said to share in true opinion, but mind is the
attribute of the gods and of very few men. Wherefore also we must
acknowledge that there is one kind of being which is always the
same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into
itself from without, nor itself going out to any other, but
invisible and imperceptible by any sense, and of which the
contemplation is granted to intelligence only. And there is another
nature of the same name with it, and like to it, perceived by sense,
created, always in motion, becoming in place and again vanishing out
of place, which is apprehended by opinion and sense. And there is a
third nature, which is space, and is eternal, and admits not of
destruction and provides a home for all created things, and is
apprehended without the help of sense, by a kind of spurious reason,
and is hardly real; which we beholding as in a dream, say of all
existence that it must of necessity be in some place and occupy a
space, but that what is neither in heaven nor in earth has no
existence. Of these and other things of the same kind, relating to the
true and waking reality of nature, we have only this dreamlike
sense, and we are unable to cast off sleep and determine the truth
about them. For an image, since the reality, after which it is
modelled, does not belong to it, and it exists ever as the fleeting
shadow of some other, must be inferred to be in another [i.e. in space
], grasping existence in some way or other, or it could not be at all.
But