TIMAEU [26]
examine the nature
of our hypothesis. In order, then, that the affections may follow
regularly after the elements, let us presuppose the existence of
body and soul.
First, let us enquire what we mean by saying that fire is hot; and
about this we may reason from the dividing or cutting power which it
exercises on our bodies. We all of us feel that fire is sharp; and
we may further consider the fineness of the sides, and the sharpness
of the angles, and the smallness of the particles, and the swiftness
of the motion-all this makes the action of fire violent and sharp,
so that it cuts whatever it meets. And we must not forget that the
original figure of fire [i.e. the pyramid], more than any other
form, has a dividing power which cuts our bodies into small pieces
(Kepmatizei), and thus naturally produces that affection which we call
heat; and hence the origin of the name (thepmos, Kepma). Now, the
opposite of this is sufficiently manifest; nevertheless we will not
fail to describe it. For the larger particles of moisture which
surround the body, entering in and driving out the lesser, but not
being able to take their places, compress the moist principle in us;
and this from being unequal and disturbed, is forced by them into a
state of rest, which is due to equability and compression. But
things which are contracted contrary to nature are by nature at war,
and force themselves apart; and to this war and convulsion the name of
shivering and trembling is given; and the whole affection and the
cause of the affection are both termed cold. That is called hard to
which our flesh yields, and soft which yields to our flesh; and things
are also termed hard and soft relatively to one another. That which
yields has a small base; but that which rests on quadrangular bases is
firmly posed and belongs to the class which offers the greatest
resistance; so too does that which is the most compact and therefore
most repellent. The nature of the light and the heavy will be best
understood when examined in connexion with our notions of above and
below; for it is quite a mistake to suppose that the universe is
parted into two regions, separate from and opposite to each other, the
one a lower to which all things tend which have any bulk, and an upper
to which things only ascend against their will. For as the universe is
in the form of a sphere, all the extremities, being equidistant from
the centre, are equally extremities, and the centre, which is
equidistant from them, is equally to be regarded as the opposite of
them all. Such being the nature of the world, when a person says
that any of these points is above or below, may he not be justly
charged with using an improper expression? For the centre of the world
cannot be rightly called either above or below, but is the centre
and nothing else; and the circumference is not the centre, and has
in no one part of itself a different relation to the centre from
what it has in any of the opposite parts. Indeed, when it is in
every direction similar, how can one rightly give to it names which
imply opposition? For if there were any solid body in equipoise at the
centre of the universe, there would be nothing to draw it to this
extreme rather than to that, for they are all perfectly similar; and
if a person were to go round the world in a circle, he would often,
when standing at the antipodes of his former position, speak of the
same point as above and below; for, as I was saying just now, to speak
of the whole which is in the form of a globe as having one part
above and another below is not like a sensible man.
The reason why these names are used, and the circumstances under
which they are ordinarily applied by us to the division of the
heavens, may be elucidated by the following supposition:-if a person
were to stand in that part of the universe which is the appointed
place of fire, and where there is the great mass of fire to which
fiery bodies gather-if, I say, he were to ascend
of our hypothesis. In order, then, that the affections may follow
regularly after the elements, let us presuppose the existence of
body and soul.
First, let us enquire what we mean by saying that fire is hot; and
about this we may reason from the dividing or cutting power which it
exercises on our bodies. We all of us feel that fire is sharp; and
we may further consider the fineness of the sides, and the sharpness
of the angles, and the smallness of the particles, and the swiftness
of the motion-all this makes the action of fire violent and sharp,
so that it cuts whatever it meets. And we must not forget that the
original figure of fire [i.e. the pyramid], more than any other
form, has a dividing power which cuts our bodies into small pieces
(Kepmatizei), and thus naturally produces that affection which we call
heat; and hence the origin of the name (thepmos, Kepma). Now, the
opposite of this is sufficiently manifest; nevertheless we will not
fail to describe it. For the larger particles of moisture which
surround the body, entering in and driving out the lesser, but not
being able to take their places, compress the moist principle in us;
and this from being unequal and disturbed, is forced by them into a
state of rest, which is due to equability and compression. But
things which are contracted contrary to nature are by nature at war,
and force themselves apart; and to this war and convulsion the name of
shivering and trembling is given; and the whole affection and the
cause of the affection are both termed cold. That is called hard to
which our flesh yields, and soft which yields to our flesh; and things
are also termed hard and soft relatively to one another. That which
yields has a small base; but that which rests on quadrangular bases is
firmly posed and belongs to the class which offers the greatest
resistance; so too does that which is the most compact and therefore
most repellent. The nature of the light and the heavy will be best
understood when examined in connexion with our notions of above and
below; for it is quite a mistake to suppose that the universe is
parted into two regions, separate from and opposite to each other, the
one a lower to which all things tend which have any bulk, and an upper
to which things only ascend against their will. For as the universe is
in the form of a sphere, all the extremities, being equidistant from
the centre, are equally extremities, and the centre, which is
equidistant from them, is equally to be regarded as the opposite of
them all. Such being the nature of the world, when a person says
that any of these points is above or below, may he not be justly
charged with using an improper expression? For the centre of the world
cannot be rightly called either above or below, but is the centre
and nothing else; and the circumference is not the centre, and has
in no one part of itself a different relation to the centre from
what it has in any of the opposite parts. Indeed, when it is in
every direction similar, how can one rightly give to it names which
imply opposition? For if there were any solid body in equipoise at the
centre of the universe, there would be nothing to draw it to this
extreme rather than to that, for they are all perfectly similar; and
if a person were to go round the world in a circle, he would often,
when standing at the antipodes of his former position, speak of the
same point as above and below; for, as I was saying just now, to speak
of the whole which is in the form of a globe as having one part
above and another below is not like a sensible man.
The reason why these names are used, and the circumstances under
which they are ordinarily applied by us to the division of the
heavens, may be elucidated by the following supposition:-if a person
were to stand in that part of the universe which is the appointed
place of fire, and where there is the great mass of fire to which
fiery bodies gather-if, I say, he were to ascend