Transformation in Christ_ On the Christian Attitude - Dietrich Von Hildebrand [105]
But this alone does not suffice. We are also called upon to concur with our transformation in Christ by single acts subject to the command of our will; that is, by the operation of our freedom in the line of its second dimension.
Transformation involves both our acts and our virtues
The moral being of the person, which we envisage here in its comprehensive sense, from the point of view of his transformation in Christ, has a twofold extension: it embraces the sphere of his single concrete acts of knowing, choosing (in the widest sense of the term inclusive of affective overtones), and doing, on the one hand; and on the other hand, the superactual or habitual sphere of what are commonly called his qualities, such as, for example, the virtues of faithfulness, justice, humility, purity, or kindness. These permanent qualities should not be interpreted as mere dispositions for this or that single decision or action, for, say, a specified act of humble submission or of charitable forgiving. They constitute a reality sui generis.
Each of the two spheres—of concrete behavior and of habitual being—has its own significance; neither is merely subservient to the other. They both glorify God in their own respective manner. Thus, every just action or attitude as such represents a new value in its own right, which adds to the value embodied by the habitual justice of a person. And again, the possession of a virtue—humility for example—means the realization of a specific value even apart from the person’s particular acts of humility.
Notwithstanding, however, the independent meaning inherent to these two spheres of personal morality, there is between them a close interconnection and interaction. On the one hand, our virtues provide the ground for our single moral acts; they facilitate the latter and underlie the special dispositions we need for their performance in the various kinds of situations that confront us. On the other hand, our single moral acts and achievements prepare our acquisition of the corresponding virtues. By repeating a good action again and again in a number of analogous cases, we shall more and more take on the habit of the virtue in question itself.
We can directly determine actions and affect our virtues
Still, our capacity to enact particular moral decisions is not conditioned by our possession of the respective virtues; conversely, our endeavor to acquire a virtue is not restricted to our performance of concrete particular decisions within its province. The center of our personality, the free agent that is the actual subject of our behavior and our decisions—as well as of our basic intention of assent to God—is by itself independent of either of the two spheres. It has the direct capacity both to evoke a moral attitude in any given particular case and to exercise in various ways a shaping and transforming influence upon our superactual moral being, our moral character as such.
Thus, the free cooperation of our central personality and our will proper is ordained to two tasks: first, that of moving us to conform to God’s will and to display a response to value pleasing to God in our single acts according to given concrete situations; secondly, to the task of rectifying our permanent superactual moral being; of stamping upon it the impress of the Christian virtues. Both are implied in the process of unfolding the supernatural life which we have received in Baptism. Now the way in which our will may exercise its influence is appreciably different in the two cases.
We can affect the character of our particular acts both directly and indirectly
First, we consider our particular