Treasure Islands - Nicholas Shaxson [147]
21.Obituary: Edmund Hoyle Vestey, 1932–2007, Blue Star Line, http://www.bluestarline.org/edmund_vestey2.htm, accessed Sept 12, 2010.
22.See “Heirs and Disgraces,” The Guardian, August 11, 1999.
CHAPTER 3 THE OPPOSITE OF OFFSHORE
1.Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: Fighting for Freedom, 1937–1946 (New York: Penguin, 2000), p. xiv.
2.Ibid., p. xv.
3.Ibid., preface and p. 98.
4.See Thomas Friedman, “Foreign Affairs Big Mac I,” New York Times, December 8, 1996. The claim ended in March 1999 when NATO forces bombed Belgrade.
5.John Maynard Keynes, “National Self-Sufficiency,” The Yale Review 22, no. 4 (June 1933): 755–769.
6.Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: Hopes Betrayed 1883–1920 (London: Macmillan, 1983), p. 220.
7.Robert Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times and Ideas of the Great Economic Thinkers (Austin, TX: Touchstone, 1999), p. 251.
8.Skidelsky, Fighting for Britain, p. 92.
9.Ibid., p. 112.
10.Ibid., p. 432.
11.Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: Fighting for Freedom, 1937–1946 (New York: Penguin, 2000), p. xxii.
12.J. Bradford DeLong, review of Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: Fighting for Britain 1937–1946, July 2001, http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/Econ_Articles/Reviews/skidelsky_jel.html.
13.Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance, p. 4.
14.Skidelsky, Fighting for Britain, pp. 340, 348.
15.Barry Eichengreen, ed., Europe’s Post-War Recovery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 99.
16.Geoff Tily, the author of a book on Keynes, believes that the main reason Keynes supported capital controls was his belief that interest rates should be set and held low. This would place Keynes firmly on the side of the industrialist (for whom interest payments were a cost) against the financier (for whom interest payments were income). See Geoff Tily, “The Policy Implications of the General Theory,” Real-World Economics Review, no. 50 (2009): 16–33, http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue50/Tily50.pdf.
17.Capital controls had emerged during the First World War as countries had sought to stop capital fleeing their countries in order to be able to tax capital income and keep interest rates low in order to finance their war efforts. Controls evaporated after the war, following lobbying by bankers, but then returned partially during the Great Depression and finally swept the world after the Second World War and the Bretton Woods arrangements. They slowly became leaky and then were progressively dismantled around the world from around the 1970s. The United States got rid of its most important controls in 1974.
18.Eric Helleiner, “Regulating Capital Flight,” in Gerald A. Epstein, ed., Capital Flight and Capital Controls in Developing Countries (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2005), pp. 290–91.
19.Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance, p. 58.
20.Ibid., p. 59.
21.Ha-Joon Chang, Bad Samaritans: The Guilty Secrets of Rich Nations and the Threat to Global Prosperity (London: Random House, 2007), p. 27.
22.Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian, “Why Did Financial Globalization Disappoint?” IMF Staff Papers (2009), pp. 56, 112–138. They seek other explanations, especially exchange-rate factors, for the disappointing performance of liberalized economies, but they do note the close correlation. Also see Monique Morrissey and Dean Baker, “When Rivers Flow Upstream: International Capital Movements in the Era of Globalization,” Center for Economic Policy Research Briefing Paper, March 2003. “A striking feature of the distribution of current account surpluses and deficits among developing countries is that most of the countries that are experiencing high GDP growth have surpluses, and often large surpluses…. The fact that most of these nations continue to experience rapid GDP growth, in spite of this large outflow of capital, suggests that the availability of capital has not been a major impediment