Voices from the Korean War - Douglas Rice [62]
Marine airplanes had spotted numerous Chinese roadblocks along the main supply route; we needed armor. Tanks from Chinhung-ni were headed to Koto-ri, but wouldn’t arrive before mid-afternoon. Being outnumbered at least ten-to-one, and no armor, our mission would be suicidal. However, the urgency at Hagaru-ri did not allow us to wait. So, we left Koto-ri without armor.
On the 29th of November, at 0945, the 41 Independent Commando attacked the first hill on the way to Hagaru-ri, taking it with little trouble. George Company swung around them, attacking the second hill. After intense fighting, we gained control of the hill.
Both units came off the hills we had just captured and moved up the supply route to our next objective. When we left, the Chinese reoccupied the two hills. Our next objective was a mile up the road, and well fortified with mortars and machine guns. As the Marines attacked along the way, they ran into a hailstorm of bullets. Casualties began to mount up and there were no replacements available. We were ordered to the road, to wait for further instructions.
Around 1130 as Drysdale contemplated his next move, he was informed that seventeen tanks would be available around 1300 hours, with another twelve two hours later. Their extra firepower would be needed to help break through the roadblocks. Plus, this would bring the task force up to 922 men, 141 vehicles, and twenty-nine tanks. So, he decided to wait.
At 1350 the attack started again, with the seventeen tanks in the lead; when the other twelve arrived they would be attached to the rear. Our pace was slow due to the many pockets of resistance, roadblocks, and craters in the road that the tanks had to maneuver around. A tactic used by the Chinese was to hunker down and the let the tanks go by, then open fire on the following vehicles. One of the main battle strategies the Chinese used was to dissect columns. To ward off such an attack, each occupant in the vehicles had to use maximum firepower.
About four miles north of Koto-ri, our attack came to a halt. Drysdale was told by the tank commander he believed the tanks could get through. However, with the road conditions and increased enemy fire, it would be costly to the rest of the task force if they proceeded. Enemy fire was taking its toll on the convoy. So, Drysdale radioed Hagaru-ri and reported his situation. Due to the urgent need of reinforcements, General Smith had no choice and ordered him to proceed—at all cost.
The order was clear; the task force had to fight its way through the Chinese, or die trying.
This was around 1615 and by the time the tanks had finished refueling, darkness had set in. Nightfall brought the Chinese blowing their bugles and whistles, along with shooting flares. The first time one experiences this, it is unnerving. However, the Marines at Koto-ri had warned everyone in the column of these tactics.
The Chinese were getting bolder and coming closer to the column. Our grenades usually broke up these close-in attacks.
About halfway to Hagaru-ri, in a place later known as Hellfire Valley, a mortar round hit a truck, setting it on fire; thereby causing a roadblock. This split the column in two, without the front of the column realizing what had happened. The only radio communication available was through the tanks. Earlier on, runners had been used, but most had been killed or wounded.
This left the Army’s Baker Company, sixty-one Commandos, and all of the Marine headquarter and service troops cut-off, and on their own. Little could be done to help them; many became casualties of the war. However, roughly three-hundred men and twelve tanks were able to fight there way back to Koto-ri.
When the head of the column