War and Peace - Leo Tolstoy [447]
At the very beginning of the campaign, our armies are cut in two, and the one goal we aim at consists in reuniting them, though for retreating and luring the enemy into the depths of the country, uniting the armies is not advantageous. The emperor is with the army to inspire it to defend every step of Russian soil, and not to retreat. The enormous camp on the Drissa is set up according to Pfuel’s plan with no intention of retreating further. The sovereign reproaches the commanders in chief for every step in retreat. Not only the burning of Moscow, but even the enemy’s advance as far as Smolensk cannot present itself to the emperor’s imagination, and when the armies unite, the sovereign is indignant that Smolensk is taken and burned and no general battle is given before its walls.
So thinks the sovereign, but the Russian commanders and all Russian people are still more indignant at the thought that our forces are retreating into the depths of the country.
Napoleon, having cut our armies in two, moves into the depths of the country and lets slip several chances for battle. In the month of August, he is in Smolensk, and his only thought is of going further, though, as we now see, this movement forward obviously spells destruction for him.
The facts say the obvious thing, that Napoleon did not foresee the danger of moving on Moscow, nor did Alexander and the Russian commanders think then about luring Napoleon, but both thought the opposite. The drawing of Napoleon into the depths of the country occurred not according to someone’s plan (no one even believed in such a possibility), but occurred as the result of the most complex interplay of intrigues, aims, and desires of the people participating in the war, who did not perceive what was to happen and what would be the only salvation of Russia. It all occurs by chance. At the beginning of the campaign, the armies are cut in two. We attempt to unite them with the obvious goal of giving battle and holding up the enemy’s advance, but in this attempt to unite, avoiding battles with the stronger enemy and involuntarily retreating at a sharp angle, we draw the enemy as far as Smolensk. But it is not enough to say that we retreat at a sharp angle, because the French are moving between the two armies—the angle becomes sharper still, and we pull further back, because Barclay de Tolly, an unpopular German,1 is hateful to Bagration (who is to be under his leadership), and Bagration, commanding the second army, tries to take as long as possible to unite with Barclay and put himself under his command. Bagration does not unite with him for a long time (though the main goal of the entire leadership lies in this union), because it seems to him that in this march he is putting his army in danger and that the most advantageous thing for him will be to retreat more to the left and south, worrying the enemy from the flank and the rear, and filling out his army in the Ukraine. But it seems he has thought up this plan because he does not want to submit to the hateful and junior-ranking German Barclay.
The emperor stays with the army in order to inspire it, but his presence, and his not knowing what to decide on, and the enormous number of advisers and plans, destroys the first army’s energy for action, and the army retreats.
At the Drissa camp the army is supposed to stop; but Paulucci, who aims at becoming commander in chief, unexpectedly affects Alexander with his energy, and Pfuel’s whole plan is dropped, and the whole business is entrusted to Barclay. But since Barclay does not inspire confidence, his power is restricted.
The armies are divided, there is no unity of leadership, Barclay is unpopular; but this confusion,