War and Peace - Leo Tolstoy [539]
Learned military men tell us quite seriously that Kutuzov ought to have moved his troops to the Kaluga road long before Fili, that someone had even suggested such a plan. But a commander in chief, especially at a difficult moment, has before him not one plan, but always dozens simultaneously. And all these plans, based on strategy and tactics, contradict each other. The work of the commander in chief seems to be merely to choose one of these plans. But he cannot even do that. Events and time do not wait. Suppose a suggestion is made to move to the Kaluga road on the twenty-eighth, but just then an adjutant comes galloping from Miloradovich and asks whether they should go into action against the French now or retreat. An order must be given at once, that minute. And the order to retreat deflects us from the turnoff to the Kaluga road. After the adjutant, a commissary comes asking where to transport the food supplies, and the head of the hospitals asking where to transport the wounded; and a courier from Petersburg brings a letter from the sovereign that does not admit the possibility of abandoning Moscow, and the commander’s rival, the one who tries to undermine him (there are always rivals—not one, but several), suggests a new plan, diametrically opposed to the plan of going to the Kaluga road; and the commander’s own forces require sleep and fortification; and a venerable general, overlooked for a reward, comes to complain, and the inhabitants beg for protection; and an officer sent to survey the terrain comes and reports the complete opposite of what an officer sent out before him had said; and a spy, a prisoner, and a general who did some reconnoitering all describe the position of the enemy army differently. People accustomed to not understanding or to forgetting all these unavoidable conditions of the activity of any commander in chief present to us, for instance, the position of the army at Fili and in so doing suppose that on the first of September the commander in chief could quite freely decide the question of whether to abandon or defend Moscow, whereas, with the Russian army positioned within three miles of Moscow, this question could not exist. When, then, was the question decided? At Drissa, and at Smolensk, and most palpably at Shevardino on the twenty-fourth, on the twenty-sixth at Borodino, and every day, hour, and minute of our retreat from Borodino to Fili.
III
The Russian troops, having retreated from Borodino, were camped at Fili. Ermolov, who had gone to survey the position, rode up to the field marshal.
“It’s not possible to fight in this position,” he said. Kutuzov looked at him in surprise and made him repeat what he had said. When he did, Kutuzov held out his hand to