War and Peace - Leo Tolstoy [780]
A man, when he acts alone, always bears within himself a certain series of considerations which guided, as it seems to him, his past activity, serve him as a justification for his present activity, and guide him in his suppositions about his future acts.
Assemblies of people do exactly the same thing, leaving it to those who do not participate in the action to think up considerations, justifications, and suppositions about their joint activity.
For reasons known or unknown to us, the French begin to drown and slaughter each other. And the event is correspondingly accompanied by its justification in the expressed wills of the people about the necessity of it for the welfare of France, for liberty, for equality. People stop slaughtering each other, and this event is accompanied by its justification in the necessity to unify power, to repulse Europe, and so on. People go from west to east, killing their own kind, and this event is accompanied by words about the glory of France, the baseness of England, and so on. History shows us that these justifications of the event have no general sense and contradict themselves, like killing a man in recognition of his rights, and killing millions in Russia to humiliate England. But in a contemporary sense, these justifications have a necessary significance.
These justifications take away the moral responsibility of the people who produce events. These temporary goals are similar to the brushes that go in front of a train to clear the way on the rails: they clear the way of people’s moral responsibility. Without these justifications, there could be no explaining the simplest question, which presents itself with the examination of every event: how is it that millions of people commit joint crimes, wars, killings, and so on?
Given the complex present-day forms of state and social life in Europe, is it possible to think up any sort of event that would not have been prescribed, indicated, ordered by sovereigns, ministers, parliaments, the newspapers? Is there any joint action that would not find its justification in state unity, in nationality, in the balance of Europe, in civilization? Thus every event that takes place inevitably coincides with some expressed desire, and, receiving its justification, is seen as a product of the will of one or more persons.
Wherever a moving ship may be heading, at its bow will always be seen the swirl of the wave it cuts through. For people on the ship, the movement of that swirl will be the only noticeable movement.
Only by following closely, moment by moment, the movement of that swirl and comparing that movement with the movement of the ship, will we realize that at every moment the movement of the swirl is determined by the movement of the ship, and that we were misled by the fact that we ourselves were imperceptibly moving.
We will see the same thing if we follow moment by moment the movement of historical figures (that is, having restored the necessary condition of all that happens—the condition of the continuity of movement in time) and do not lose sight of the necessary connection of historical figures with the masses.
When a ship goes in one direction, there is one and the same swirl at its bow; when it frequently changes direction, the swirl running ahead of it also shifts frequently. But wherever it turns, there will always be a swirl preceding its movement.
Whatever happens, it will always turn out that that very thing had been foreseen and ordered. Wherever a ship heads, the swirl, without guiding it, without reinforcing its movement, foams at its bow, and from afar will appear to us not only to be moving by its own will, but to be guiding the movement of the ship.
Considering only those expressions of the will of historical figures which relate to events as orders, historians have supposed that events depend on orders. Considering the events by themselves and that connection with the masses in which historical figures find themselves, we have discovered that historical figures and their orders depend