Washington [406]
Some in the Senate believed that Washington wanted them merely to rubber-stamp treaties and appointments instead of exercising independent judgment. When Maclay requested a reading of the supporting treaties between the southern Indians and three southern states, Washington fixed him with an icy glare. “I cast an eye at the president of the United States,” Maclay wrote. “I saw he wore an aspect of stern displeasure.”23 Robert Morris moved that the papers brought by Washington be referred to a committee. When Maclay defended the propriety of this motion, Washington’s expression grew even more forbidding, and he hotly contested the idea of committing anything to a committee. *“ ‘This defeats every purpose of my coming here’ were the first words that he said,” Maclay wrote in his diary. “He then went on that he had brought his Secretary at War with him to give every necessary information.”24 Washington refused to yield on the committee proposal, although he agreed to postpone the matter. In Maclay’s version of events, Washington, having shown flashes of temper, withdrew with “a discontented air” and a sense of “sullen dignity.”25
A couple of days later Washington returned to the Senate, which approved the three commissioners to negotiate with the Creeks. It proved his farewell appearance in the Senate chamber. In a decision pregnant with lasting consequences, Washington decided that he would henceforth communicate with that body on paper rather than in person and trim “advice and consent” to the word consent. For instance, when Washington appointed David Humphreys as a diplomat to the Court of Portugal in February 1791, Maclay noted that the choice was sent to the Senate as a fait accompli: “The president sends first and asks for our advice and consent after.”26
This decision may have done more to define the presidency and the conduct of American foreign policy than an entire bookshelf of Supreme Court decisions on the separation of powers. Where the Constitution had been sketchy about presidential powers in foreign affairs, Washington made the chief executive the principal actor, enabling him to initiate treaties and nominate appointees without first huddling with the Senate. It was an instinctive reaction from a man who had grown accustomed to command during the war. If a touch imperious, it was a far more realistic approach to foreign policy than constant collaboration and horse-trading between the president and Senate. For one thing, the presidency was continuously in session, unlike Congress, and it was much easier for one man to take decisive action, especially in an emergency. Washington’s decision also widened the distance between president and Senate, enabling the latter to function as an independent, critical voice in foreign policy rather than as a subordinate advisory panel.
An enduring mystery of Washington’s presidency is why he relegated John Adams to a minor role. A Washington biographer is struck by the paucity of letters exchanged between the two men; Adams was clearly excluded from the inner circle of advisers. Partly this was a structural phenomenon. Under the Constitution, the vice president served as president of the Senate, thus overlapping two branches of governments. Nowadays we