Washington [475]
At a cabinet meeting the next day, the thirteen questions spurred a brisk exchange between Jefferson and Hamilton. Sympathetic to the French Revolution, Jefferson opposed an immediate neutrality declaration, preferring to have England and France bid for American favor. Thunderstruck at the notion of auctioning American honor, Hamilton favored an immediate declaration. Their dispute hinged on fundamentally disparate views of what America owed France for her wartime assistance. Like many Americans, Jefferson thought the United States should embrace a longtime ally and honor the 1778 treaties with France, while Hamilton deemed them invalid because they had involved only a defensive alliance and had been signed by the now-beheaded Louis XVI. “Knox subscribed at once to H[amilton]’s opinion that we ought to declare the treaty void, acknowledging at the same time, like a fool as he is, that he knew nothing about it,” an embittered Jefferson wrote.33 Hamilton contended that France had aided the American Revolution only to undercut the British Empire. He won the debate about issuing a neutrality proclamation, and agreement to receive a minister from the French Republic was unanimous.
Drafted by Attorney General Randolph, the neutrality proclamation signed on April 22, 1793, was a monumental achievement for Washington’s administration. This milestone of foreign policy, which refrained from employing the word neutrality, exhorted Americans to “pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers” and simultaneously warned them against “committing, aiding or abetting hostilities against any of the said powers” or carrying contraband articles. 34 Washington, a hardheaded realist, believed devoutly in neutrality and never doubted that nations are governed by their interests, not by their emotions.
This proud, courageous proclamation became a centerpiece of foreign policy for the next century, but it had no shortage of congressional critics. In a key assertion of executive power—denigrated by Republicans as a royaledict—Washington had bypassed the Senate, refusing to call it into session. Many in Congress reasoned that, if Congress had the power to declare war, it also had the power to declare neutrality. Many Americans had difficulty countenancing an end to the French alliance. Madison was especially disturbed by what he deemed a violation of congressional prerogatives, a betrayal of Franco-American ties, and capitulation to “the unpopular cause of Anglomany.”35 He feared that the president would abuse war-making powers: “The constitution supposes, what the history of all governments demonstrates, that the executive is the branch of power most interested in war, and most prone to use it,” he wrote. “It has accordingly, with studied care, vested the question of war in the legislature.”36 Executive power in foreign affairs would grow steadily during the next two centuries, perhaps confirming the truth of Madison’s warning.
As England and France studied the exact meaning of American neutrality, the proclamation prompted a significant constitutional debate. Writing under the pen names of “Pacificus” and “Helvidius,” respectively, Hamilton and Madison sparred over its legality; Hamilton claimed executive branch primacy in foreign policy, while Madison made the case for the legislature. Unless he deliberately feigned ignorance, Washington had little inkling that the secretive Madison had led the charge against his neutrality policy. “The president is extremely anxious to know your sentiments on the proclamation,” Jefferson