Washington Rules_ America's Path to Permanent War - Andrew J. Bacevich [44]
Rolling Thunder’s leading proponents did not set out to destroy North Vietnam. Although Curtis LeMay was then still advocating a one-size-fits-all solution to the problem—“bomb them into the Stone Age”—they rejected this maximalist approach in favor of what they considered more nuanced and discriminating methods.68 The object of the exercise was not to obliterate but to influence. Through a “measured, controlled sequence of actions,” consistent with the spirit of flexible response, the United States intended to “persuade [North Vietnam] to stop its intervention in the South.”69
Yet just as Mansfield had predicted, the air offensive against the North almost immediately generated demands for additional reinforcements in the South. By February 23, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the senior commander in Saigon, was already pressing for a marine battalion to secure the American base at Da Nang, essential to U.S. air operations.70 Four days later, President Johnson approved the commitment of not one, but two marine battalions, supplemented by a helicopter squadron.71 On March 2, McNamara cabled Taylor with the news that he was sending army chief of staff Gen. Harold K. Johnson on a mission to Saigon “to examine . . . what more can be done within South Vietnam.” In his consultations with General Johnson, McNamara advised Taylor to “assume no limitation on funds, equipment, or personnel.”72
On March 10, Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton, a key McNamara aide, produced a paper offering “a massive US ground effort” in South Vietnam as one possible way to regain the upper hand.73 On March 14, General Johnson produced his “what more can be done” proposal, which floated the possibility of deploying four U.S. divisions across South Vietnam and Laos.74 Within two days, Bundy was writing that the deployment of major U.S. ground forces “may soon be necessary for both military and political reasons.”75
On March 18, Taylor signaled his support for sending a U.S. Army combat division to South Vietnam.76 On March 20, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told McNamara that the commitment of major U.S. combat formations had become “imperative if defeat is to be avoided.”77 At an April 6 meeting of the National Security Council, President Johnson approved a major expansion of U.S. support personnel in South Vietnam, entailing an additional eighteen thousand to twenty thousand troops. He also revised the mission of the marines already in Da Nang “to permit their more active use.”78 Finally, on April 14, at a luncheon meeting with Bundy, McNamara, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the president agreed to the immediate deployment of the army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade, to begin combat operations near Bien Hoa. The American war in Vietnam now began in earnest.
Just shy of one hundred days earlier Ambassador Taylor had ventured to suggest that “the game” needed opening up. During the weeks that followed, he and his colleagues had done that and more; indeed, they had radically transformed the game. That they were able to do so reflected modifications to the Washington rules implemented under the auspices of flexible response.
Between 1961 and 1965 much had happened. No longer did observers wonder if CIA headquarters in Langley or SAC headquarters in Omaha had hijacked basic national security policy. From his perch in the Pentagon, McNamara was in charge of the military, including General LeMay. Indeed, McNamara’s control of Operation Rolling Thunder extended