Washington Rules_ America's Path to Permanent War - Andrew J. Bacevich [66]
In virtually every case, weapons design reflected a commitment to incremental refinements. So, although the M1 Abrams tank fielded in the 1980s was a wonder to behold, it expressed a vision of land combat that dated back to World War I and had reached maturity in the 1940s. Much the same could be said of the navy’s post-Vietnam Nimitz-class carriers and of the air force’s new B-1 bomber and F-15 and F-16 fighters. An officer from any of the services transported from the 1940s to the 1980s would have been impressed with the hardware available—everything was faster, bigger, and sleeker—but would have found the organization, operations, and institutional culture that went with these weapons comfortably familiar.
The new generation of weapons did differ from their predecessors in one respect: They were exceedingly expensive. Even the generous budgets of the 1980s funded their purchase in only limited numbers. A similar limitation applied to the procurement of volunteers for the all-volunteer force: They cost a lot and were not easily replaced. So the post-Vietnam reforms also saw the services shift from a traditional reliance on sheer mass to destroy any adversary, as epitomized by the LeMay approach to strategic bombing, to a greater stress on quality. Among other things, this meant placing greater emphasis on training and retention. Those volunteering to serve became an increasingly valued commodity.
This increased attention to quality fostered one exception to the Pentagon’s otherwise consistent preoccupation with conventional warfare. In the wake of Vietnam, so-called special operations forces proliferated. Elite units—among them navy SEALs and the army’s Rangers, Green Berets, Delta Force, and 160th Aviation Regiment—assumed responsibility for an array of unconventional tasks ranging from clandestine reconnaissance and counterterror missions to hostage rescue, psychological operations (PSYOPS), and support for friendly indigenous forces. In 1987, Congress acknowledged the growing importance of these activities by creating a new four-star Special Operations Command, signifying that the members of this “community” had achieved a status separate from but at least equal to the bulk of U.S. forces.
Americans quickly learned that most of what happens in the world of special operations lies beyond their purview. Capabilities, activities, and even budgets are all classified. Public accountability is minimal. In effect, after Vietnam the Pentagon increased its presence in the “black world,” encroaching upon and then moving well beyond the territory originally staked out by Allen Dulles and his colleagues. When it came to covert action, the CIA no longer enjoyed even the approximation of a monopoly.
From the perspective of the officer corps, the post-Vietnam reform project reached its apotheosis in the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991. For the armed services, and especially for Powell, then serving as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Operation Desert Storm came as validation and vindication. Victory over Iraq, generously credited by the Department of Defense with possessing “the fourth largest army in the world, an army hardened in long years of combat against Iran,” vanquished the memory of defeat in Southeast Asia.5
By assembling a combat force of several hundred thousand soldiers in a harsh, unforgiving environment, Powell and his fellow Vietnam veterans had reaffirmed the unequaled ability of the United States to reposition massive amounts of combat power just about anywhere on the planet. Powell had promised to destroy the Iraqi army—“First, we’re going to cut it off, and then we’re going to kill it”—and U.S. troops had seemingly made good on that promise.6 At first blush, Operation Desert Storm appeared a stupendous achievement, a victory without parallel in the annals of warfare.
It promptly vaulted Powell to the status of national hero. The general wasted no time in advertising the just-completed campaign as the approved template for all future American wars. This was the way it was supposed to be done: