Whirlwind - Barrett Tillman [101]
Despite serious drawbacks, the British Commonwealth aircrews and sailors stuck to their duty. In four weeks operating over Japan, BPF aircraft sank or destroyed at least three warships, two transports, and a coastal defense vessel.
The British fliers paid a high price for their contribution, but they took pride in their work. A TF 38 staffer recalled a British Corsair pilot who landed aboard USS Shangri-La to refuel. “The kid was 18 or 19 years old but he handled an F4U perfectly well. I was impressed.”
The Immobile Fleet
Through much of the war the Imperial Navy’s striking arm was designated the Mobile Fleet. But in October 1944 the Battle of Leyte Gulf ended Japan’s offensive naval capability, prompting the American taunt of the “immobile fleet.”
On paper the emperor’s remaining armada appeared impressive: Kure Naval Base in the Inland Sea boasted three carriers, three battleships, and three active cruisers plus nautical cats and dogs. But the ships represented no threat beyond the traditional naval “force in being.” Undermanned, lacking sufficient fuel oil, deprived of meaningful air cover, they could only sulk in their mined-in harbors.
Nevertheless, Admiral Ernest King in Washington wanted the Kure armada put on the muddy bottom in July 1945. Nimitz concurred, and Halsey was delighted to comply.
The official explanation for the July attacks appears a facade to cover other agendas. Officially, the Joint Chiefs held that when the Soviets finally entered the war they would demand increased Lend-Lease supplies. With the Third Fleet overwhelmingly committed to supporting Operation Olympic from October onward, presumably early strikes to knock out the remaining Japanese warships would reduce the need for powerful forces up north.
A cogent assessment was offered four decades later by then Lieutenant Commander William N. Leonard, McCain’s assistant operations officer. Leonard recounted, “Some Neanderthals back at PacFleet Headquarters wanted continuation of a navy versus navy fight and we lost many good people to no good purpose. With the Jap navy lying doggo, PacFleet began to assert itself more and more into the assignment of missions and objectives of the fast carriers.”
Leonard’s attitude largely mirrored that of Commander Task Force 38 (CTF-38). McCain considered the Kure strikes “a waste of time” but could only go so far in objecting. Occasionally he argued with Halsey, though seldom successfully. Instead, he talked to pilots over coffee, asking their opinions and sometimes accepted their advice.
McCain opposed targeting shipping, preferring to strike airfields and aircraft factories, though he kept his counsel for the moment. However, his priorities also were skewed: events had already shown the benefits of sinking Japanese coastal traffic such as Hokkaido’s rail ferries—a task that carrier aircraft could accomplish with relative ease. But whatever their service, airmen were magnetically pulled toward the enemy’s aviation industry, while steamers and merchantmen lacked the perceived glamour of aircraft factories.
Nobody would admit it—certainly not in writing—but at least some of the impetus for the July operations probably had more to do with service politics than winning the war. Both the Navy and the Army Air Forces were looking not far downrange when the inevitable Washington battle would be joined, determining whether there would be an independent air force. Almost certainly the admirals wanted to run up the score, demonstrating naval aviation’s huge contribution to destroying the enemy fleet, and the fat pickings at Kure became irresistible: over 200,000 tons in major combatants.
In some ways, Kure represented the greatest flak trap in history. The big harbor contained