Whirlwind - Barrett Tillman [106]
Whether the cost of the Kure strikes was worth the result remains one of the least examined questions of the Pacific War. In his often self-serving memoir, Halsey enumerated four reasons for the strikes. He opined that America’s national honor and morale required total destruction of the Japanese navy; that such destruction was necessary to prevent interdiction of future convoys to Russia; that Tokyo might use its remaining fleet for negotiating leverage as Germany had done in 1919; and ultimately that he had orders. He concluded, “If the other reasons had been invalid, that one alone would have been enough for me.”
Halsey’s enumerations remain transparently unconvincing. In the first place, American morale in no way turned on destruction of the rusting remnants of the Imperial Navy. The greatest morale involved was Bull Halsey’s. The huge majority of Americans merely wished the war over, and the main seagoing phase had ended in October 1944.
Secondly, the U.S. Navy could easily dominate the North Pacific in the vastly unlikely event that any Japanese force escaped its mine-choked bases to deploy more than 1,000 miles from home. Furthermore, absent requests from Moscow, no such requirement pertained.
Halsey’s third point was even more absurd. The Allies’ preexisting demand of unconditional surrender automatically scuttled any naval bargaining that Tokyo might have attempted in such nonexistent proceedings.
The fourth point would seem the strongest, as King and Nimitz had decreed an end to the “defueled doggo fleet.” But by July 1945, Halsey surely felt bulletproof. He had escaped all accountability (if not major blame) for the Leyte Gulf debacle and failing to avoid a ship-killing typhoon in December. The defenders of his position were five-star guardians: Nimitz, who allowed sentiment to trump objectivity, and the decidedly unsentimental King in Washington, who refused to hand the Air Force a political victory. But the fact remained that between Leyte Gulf in October 1944 and “Halsey’s hurricane” in December, the Third Fleet commander was widely considered directly or indirectly responsible for the unnecessary loss of seven ships and some 1,450 sailors and aircrew.
Had Halsey declined to expend scores of fliers and 100 aircraft in a needless exercise, his chances of being replaced approached absolute zero. But rather than take counsel of the Task Force 38 staff, The Bull was eager to comply with orders that gratified his vanity at the expense of eighty-three young men who died at Kure attacking impotent, immobile ships.
Halsey’s seeming indifference to casualties drew sharp criticism from subordinates. One aviator spoke for many when he noted, “Halsey is going wild on publicity and we are all fed [up] to the teeth listening to all the crap he is putting out. . . . Halsey is a big disappointment to me as he is to most of us.”
Typhoon weather brewed up at the end of July, and Third Fleet steamed eastward for an extended period of refueling. From August 3 to 9 the force reprovisioned at sea, conducted training, and coped with worsening weather.
Meanwhile, Nimitz directed Halsey to steer clear of southern Japan. Honoring the peculiar directive, Third Fleet remained north of the 37th parallel, striking northern Honshu. The mystery was soon made clear with word of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
August 9
The harbor war continued on August 9. It featured significant actions by two of the U.S. Navy’s allies: the British Royal Navy and the U.S. Army Air Forces.
On Okinawa Lieutenant Colonel Edwin H. Hawes commanded the veteran 38th Bomb Group. The “Sun Setters” had been in combat for three years, still flying the B-25. The first aircraft to bomb Japan also was among the last.
The 38th’s specialty was shipping strikes, and Hawes declared, “If we ever find a Jap carrier in our range, we are going after it.”
Reconnaissance flights had found a flattop in Beppu Bay on Kyushu,