Whirlwind - Barrett Tillman [111]
Firmly gripped by the mind-set that their German allies called “cloud cuckoo land,” Japan’s leaders rejected the Allies’ July 26 Potsdam Declaration offering either surrender or “prompt and utter destruction.” In doing so Tokyo ensured an apocalyptic denouement to the saga it had initiated forty-five months before.
Hiroshima
The Manhattan Project represented only half of the equation necessary to deliver atomic bombs upon the Axis. The other half—the B-29—was already a proven factor by July 1945. Between them the two programs accounted for some $4.4 billion, with the Superfortress by far the greater share.
The unit responsible for dropping atomic bombs was unique in the world’s air forces. The 509th Composite Group comprised one bomb squadron and a transport squadron; with auxiliary units the roster only totaled 1,767 men. Activated at remote, windy Wendover, Utah, in December 1944, the 509th was created to deliver “special weapons” against Germany and Japan. The commander was twenty-nine-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Paul W. Tibbets, who had flown B-17s in North Africa and Europe. He displayed a low-key earnestness; a subordinate recorded his first impression: “His manner was reserved and soft spoken, yet he projected an air of professionalism and self assurance.”
The 509th received B-29s specially modified to carry atom bombs, though none of the fliers yet knew of their ordnance. Only forty-six “Silverplate” aircraft were produced during the war, and the group took fifteen to combat. Besides alterations to the bomb bays and removal of all turrets, the Silverplated B-29s had reversible propellers, permitting a shorter landing distance.
With Germany’s surrender in May 1945, Tibbets’s original orders to conduct a double strike in Europe and Japan were necessarily changed. His crews began landing in the Marianas in June, based on Tinian. Shrouded in secrecy—the Silverplate bombers bore markings of three other units—the group flew few missions, mostly to bypassed Japanese-occupied islands. Actually the 509th was sharpening its aim with five-ton “pumpkin bombs” of the same shape as the atomic weapons. But while other groups flew regularly and took losses, the newcomers seemed immune to routine chores. Eventually a bit of doggerel expressed the growing resentment:
Into the air the secret arose,
Where they’re going, nobody knows.
Tomorrow they’ll return again,
But we’ll never know where they’ve been.
Don’t ask us about results or such,
Unless you want to get in dutch.
But take it from one who is sure of the score,
The 509th is winning the war.
The weapon components completed their 6,590-mile journey from the wilds of New Mexico to the hardstand on Tinian on July 26. Meanwhile, orders were descending from Washington via General Carl Spaatz, commander of U.S. Strategic Air Forces. Having seen what the 8th and 15th Air Forces had done to Germany, he still insisted that conventional bombing could topple Japan. But it was also possible that he was squeamish about wielding a new weapon of such incredible power.
In any case, “Tooey” Spaatz tried to have it both ways and largely succeeded. Apparently protecting himself from future criticism, he required a written order to use atomic bombs against Japanese cities. On July 25 he received a directive from Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and Secretary of War Henry Stimson. Actually, General Marshall was attending the Potsdam Conference, and his directive was issued by his deputy. General Thomas T. Handy’s message to Spaatz said