Whirlwind - Barrett Tillman [134]
4 One observer: Masatake Okumiya and Jiro Horikoshi with Martin Caidin, Zero: The Story of Japan’s Air War in the Pacific (New York: Bantam, 1991), 315.
4 “extremely satisfactory”: “The Tokyo Raid,” Headquarters, Army Air Forces Director of Intelligence, October 5, 1942.
5 the 16,700-ton Taigei: “IJN Ryuho: Tabular Record of Movement,” http://www.combinedfleet.com/Ryuho.htm.
5 Tokyo reported six schools: Conrad Black, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Champion of Freedom (New York: PublicAffairs, 2003), 727.
6 “No sir”: James H. Doolittle and Carroll V. Glines, I Could Never Be So Lucky Again (New York: Bantam, 1991), 12.
7 The toll: Jon Grinspan, “April 18, 1942: Pearl Harbor Avenged,” AmericanHeritage.com, http://www.americanheritage.com/people/articles/web/20070418-tokyo-doolittle-raid-jimmy-doolittle-pearl-harbor-battle-of-midway-world-war-II-japan.shtml.
CHAPTER ONE: BEFORE THE BEGINNING
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9 “Aeronautics opened up”: Giulio Douhet, Command of the Air (Dino Ferrari, translator) (New York: Coward-McCann, 1942), 3.
10 “issuing false news”: Philip S. Meilinger, “Giulio Douhet: The Origins of Airpower Theory,” The Paths of Heaven: Evolution of Airpower Theory (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1997), 10.
13 “almost treasonable administration”: American Airpower Biography, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/mitch.html.
16 “relentless and incessant offensiveness”: Philip S. Meilinger, “Trenchard, Slessor, and Royal Air Force Doctrine Before World War II,” The Paths of Heaven: Evolution of Airpower Theory (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1997), 44, 46.
18 “the very threat”: Lieutenant Colonel Marc A. Clodfelter, in Philip S. Meilinger, “Molding Airpower Convictions: Development and Legacy of William Mitchell’s Strategic Thought,” The Paths of Heaven: Evolution of Airpower Theory (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1997), 96–97.
18 In twenty years of discussion: Lieutenant Colonel Peter R. Faber, in Philip S. Meilinger, “Interwar US Army Aviation and the Air Corps Tactical School,” The Paths of Heaven: Evolution of Airpower Theory (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1997), 212–21.
20 “In view of the world situation”: AWPD-1: The Process, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, Air University Press, Historical Analysis: Joint Doctrine Air Campaign course, 1996, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/readings/awpd-1-jfacc/awpdproc.htm.
21 “in one blow”: Ibid.
21 about half of Bomber Command: Max Hastings, Bomber Command: The Myths and Reality of the Strategic Bombing Offensive, 1939–45 (New York: Dial, 1979), 370.
22 By one reckoning: Philip S. Meilinger, “Alexander P. de Seversky and American Airpower,” The Paths of Heaven: Evolution of Airpower Theory (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1997), 266.
22 some of his lessons: Alexander P. de Seversky, Victory Through Air Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942), 120–52. Seversky’s lessons:
1. No land or sea operations are possible without air superiority.
2. Navies have lost their function of strategic offensive.
3. Blockade has become a function of airpower.
4. Only airpower can defeat airpower.
5. Land-based aviation is always superior to ship-based aviation.
6. Air-striking radius must equal the maximum dimensions of the theater of operations.
7. In aviation, quality is relatively more decisive than quantity.
8. Aircraft types must be specialized for strategic and tactical concerns.
9. Destruction of enemy morale can best be accomplished by precision bombing.
10. Unity of command applies to aviation as well as land and naval operations.
11.