Whirlwind - Barrett Tillman [15]
From the early 1930s, Japan was increasingly dominated by the military, with active-duty or retired generals and admirals in the nominally civilian posts of war and navy minister. But the nation had no central command comparable to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and there was little coordination between diplomatic and military actions. Raised in a pervasive atmosphere of racial and cultural superiority, generations of Japanese assumed that because they dominated Asia, the same must apply globally.
Historian Dr. M. G. Sheftall notes that many ultranationalists adhered to a form of thirteenth-century Nichiren Buddhism popular in prewar Japanese literature. Their worldview was dominated by the concept of a multigenerational confrontation between East and West, climaxing in an apocalyptic victory bringing peace on earth. That view fit nicely with the ideology of “eight corners of the world under one roof.”
Whatever the guiding philosophy, Japan’s war policy was largely determined by the Supreme Council, known as “The Big Six,” comprising the prime minister, foreign minister, army minister and chief of staff, and navy minister and chief of staff. As per the 1889 constitution, the emperor was nominally supreme commander and, though he sanctioned laws, he was not head of government. Prince Hirohito had assumed the throne as Emperor Showa (Enlightenment) in 1926, and when he died in 1989 he had been the twentieth century’s longest-serving head of state.
Imperial General Headquarters had been established in 1938, responsible for overseeing the undeclared war with China. That same year the civilian population was brought more fully into the constant state of conflict with gasoline rationing and occasional rice shortages. The government tightened its control of industry; press censorship was administered by the Home Ministry; and military training became compulsory in schools.
Despite the increased war footing, Japan tangled with the Soviet giant in 1939. Tokyo controlled Manchuria but sought more, leading to a Mongolian border dispute known as the Battle of Nomohan. It ended in a decisive Russian victory after four months of fighting.
Nevertheless, Tokyo set its geopolitical sights on most of China and even India. But the army and navy had very different agendas. The army, most influential in government circles, favored not only continuing but expanding Japan’s conquests on the Asian mainland. The navy, naturally more worldly, had a better concept of what lay beyond the horizon. Essentially, the navy wanted a secure source of oil to fuel the fleet. That meant the Dutch East Indies. The army wanted China. Resolving the differences took enormous effort, especially given the services’ long-standing disagreements that often boiled into outright animosity. Nevertheless, the generals had their way, and 7.1 million uniformed Japanese served the cause of expanding what the Japanese termed the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”
Once set upon a collision course with America and the West, Japan counted on its offensive policy to acquire a Pacific moat spanning thousands of miles. Given the immense distances involved, the state of aviation technology, and the superiority of the Imperial Navy, Tokyo’s ramparts appeared safe from significant risk of attack.
It was a fatal miscalculation based upon the willing consumption of a toxic cocktail, equal parts national inferiority complex, institutional arrogance, and racial pride. A generation of Japanese would learn that a more bitter concoction had never been brewed.
CHAPTER TWO
China Skies