Whirlwind - Barrett Tillman [19]
Paul Tibbets’s job was essentially that of a salesman. Having flown some of the first AAF bombing missions over Occupied Europe, he possessed the credentials to make new fliers listen to him. But the word about the ’29 had quickly circulated, and in some quarters it was regarded as a widow maker. Pilots heard the stories (mostly true) of in-flight fires, spectacular crashes, and an accident rate 30 percent higher than for other bombers.
Paul Tibbets had a plan.
He turned to the Women Airforce Service Pilots who ferried Army aircraft all over the country. Tibbets searched until he found two of the shortest, cutest WASPs available and taught them to fly the Superfortress. Then he went on the road, demonstrating the ’29’s exceptional performance to shame and educate “all those college athletes” who feared the airplane.
Even with production B-29s rolling off the first assembly line in September 1943, problems remained. Each had to be corrected (or at least addressed), leading to numerous solutions. As many as fifty fixes were required, but it took too long to interrupt production and implement the changes in the factories. Therefore, the AAF established four modification centers around the country to retrofit the changes before the bombers went to their operational units. The “mods” included fixes to engines, propellers, rudders, turrets, bomb bay doors, and radar installations.
The situation did not sit well with General Hap Arnold, a hands-on administrator who suffered four heart attacks in less than three years. In late 1943 he said, “It is my desire that this airplane be produced in quantity so that it can be used in this war and not in the next.”
Clearly, the B-29 was headed for war as an immature weapon, but the need was considered urgent. Consequently, shortcuts were taken.
Crew training suffered perhaps most of all. When Ken Wolfe established the 58th Bomb Wing in Kansas during the summer of 1943, his four groups were short of everything, including B-29s. Especially B-29s. Moreover, the original ratio of combat-experienced pilots in the wing fell far short of expectations, as did those with the desired 400 hours of multi-engine flight time. Consequently, until enough Superfortresses became available some squadrons trained on Martin B-26s, fast twin-engine bombers with nose wheels and high landing speeds comparable to the B-29. Others reverted to B-17s, especially for practicing high-altitude-formation flights.
With the 58th Wing based around Wichita, “The Battle of Kansas” proceeded apace. That winter was particularly harsh, with wind-driven snow whipping across the Great Plains, freezing Army and civilian technicians alike because there were too few hangars. Most maintenance and modification was done on the tarmac, exposed to miserable working conditions.
Ready or not, the 58th Wing had a date in China, honoring a commitment that Franklin Roosevelt felt he owed Generalissimo Chiang.
Introducing “B-san”
The Japanese knew that America was developing a successor to the B-17, itself an intimidating presence in Pacific skies. In early 1943 news reports reached Tokyo of the death of test pilot Eddie Allen in the crash of “a new Boeing bomber” that February. Furthermore, American intention to mount a strategic bombing campaign against the home islands was no secret: Hap Arnold had said as much, and Domei News Service picked up information from its Buenos Aires and Lisbon bureaus in February and March.
With solid knowledge of the Boeing prototype’s existence, the intelligence section of Army Air Force Headquarters was expanded to track the program. Initial assumptions of the configuration were approximately accurate: a mid-wing, four-engine aircraft with total loaded weight “in the forty-ton class.” Defensive armament was estimated at four to six 20mm cannon, and bomb load