Whirlwind - Barrett Tillman [43]
On December 27, O’Donnell tried again to deliver a knockout blow against the Musashino complex. The 73rd Wing put up seventy-two bombers in the command’s last mission of the year, another daylight effort. However, the abort rate went through the hangar roof—a staggering 28 percent. For those crews that reached Japan, low clouds and the jet stream conspired once more to thwart their effort. As usual, the Japanese had plenty of warning and positioned four fighter regiments to intercept, plus one naval group flying a menagerie of single- and twin-engine types.
Some B-29s got above the interceptors, climbing to nearly 34,000 feet. But altitude ruined accuracy, and the bombing was miserable—only six hits within 1,000 feet of the aim point. Furthermore, the fifty-two attackers trickled into the target area for more than an hour, diluting the bombers’ defensive firepower against some 270 fighter passes.
The Americans were lucky to escape with just three losses, two operationally. All were from the 498th Group, whose Uncle Tom’s Cabin fell to savage fighter attacks. The beleaguered Boeing went down fighting, having been rammed twice. Other interceptors pursued the crippled bomber, hammering away with cannon and machine gun fire. Finally Major Thomas Krause’s plane spun into Tokyo Bay. Three of the crew bailed out, and though all survived captivity, Major William Walker died one day after liberation.
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XXI Bomber Command had launched five missions to Japan in December, totaling 415 sorties with nineteen losses. That equaled a 4 percent casualty rate, which was acceptable for B-17s and B-24s but was heavy for the much costlier Superfortresses. Bombing results were assessed as “good” on only two occasions, both against the Mitsubishi plant in Nagoya. In the eight homeland missions since November 24, no target had been destroyed.
Almost every major mission cost Superfortresses lost at sea, and back in Washington Hap Arnold took note. In 1944 a B-29 cost $605,000, nearly three times a B-17, and the noncombat loss rate was a constant concern. Consequently, Arnold wrote Hansell, “In my opinion the B-29 cannot be treated in the same way we treat a fighter, medium bomber, or even a Flying Fortress. We must consider the B-29 more in terms of a naval vessel, and we do not lose naval vessels in threes and fours without a very thorough analysis of the causes and what preventive measures may be taken to avoid losses in the future.” Hansell certainly knew that his efficiency was subject to close scrutiny, and likely suspected that his command was at stake.
A New Year
While cynical GIs rhymed that they would see “The Golden Gate in ’48,” Hansell’s command struck Japan four times in the first nineteen days of January 1945, beginning on the 3rd. Mission 17 sent the B-29s to Nagoya’s port and industrial area, but of ninety-seven dispatched, a disappointing eighteen aborted—nearly one in five. Dropping through six-tenths cloud cover, the bombing was rated “fair” as reconnaissance showed 140,000 square feet of docks and urban area destroyed, and crews reported seventy-five fires throughout the area—the product of an increasing proportion of incendiary bombs. Though the Japanese were far more active than before with 346 fighter attacks, they only downed one bomber while B-29 gunners claimed fourteen kills. Three other bombers went missing, cause unknown.
One flier survived a horrifying experience. Japanese fighters attacked the 497th’s American Maid, wounding the tail gunner and shooting out the left side blister at