Whirlwind - Barrett Tillman [45]
Under New Management
Curtis LeMay returned to Guam on January 19 and, in pilot talk, “shook the stick” to signal “I’ve got it” the next day. He landed in an awkward situation, relieving an old and valued friend, but he was senior to Hansell and had already proven himself a rare innovator. In a well-meaning but unworkable gesture, Arnold tossed Hansell a bone, offering him a slot as LeMay’s deputy, but the Possum declined to chew it. As he later said, LeMay “didn’t need any ‘assistant commander’ and I . . . would not be content to stay completely in the background.”
LeMay asked Hansell to remain awhile to help with the transition, and he agreed to stay for several days. Fortunately, Hansell’s chief operations officer was well known to LeMay: Colonel John Montgomery, one of the early B-17 fliers from Langley Field, Virginia, in 1937–38. LeMay was pleased to have his old colleague onboard; they would work closely in the months to come.
On January 19, the day LeMay arrived from China, Hansell launched Mission 20 against the Kawasaki aircraft factory at Akashi, on the coast west of Kobe. Of eighty Superforts dispatched, sixty-two bombed the primary target and nine opted for alternates. An abort reduced the 499th Group’s deception force (drawing attention of enemy radar) to just two planes, which drew twenty fighter attacks. One navigator confided, “This was a nail biter for us.”
Flying in decent weather for a change—less than three-tenths cloud cover—the B-29s inflicted serious damage on the plant with nearly 40 percent of the complex’s roof area totally or partially destroyed. Furthermore, all the bombers returned—the first time that had happened since operations began almost two months before.
However, the success of the 19th proved short-lived. The next mission, four days later, was the first flown under LeMay’s aegis, and it did not please him. Eradicate No. 3 targeted the Mitsubishi factory at Nagoya, and only twenty-eight of seventy-three planes attacked the primary from above a nearly solid undercast. Despite extremely heavy fighter opposition—nearly 700 fighter passes were counted—only one bomber was lost to enemy action and one operationally. (B-29 gunners claimed thirty-three kills for their biggest day so far.) But the greater concern was the abort rate and negligible damage to the engine plant. With 18 percent aborts and fewer than half the effective sorties bombing the designated target, Curt LeMay reckoned that he had much to do.
The January 27 mission produced more drama with a two-tiered battle against the weather and the defenders, in that order. Two B-29s provided advance information on conditions over Musashino and Nagoya, deeming the best chances were offered by Target 357—the resilient Nakajima plant at Musashino. However, by the time the main force of some sixty planes arrived an hour later, the clouds had closed in with a ten-tenths carpet. There was no option except radar drops on the Tokyo urban area, with no bomb strikes observed.
Meanwhile, nobody had trouble seeing Japanese fighters, which were up and waiting. In addition to a huge increase in interceptor sorties, there were also more ramming attempts, some of which succeeded. Attacking between 24,000 and 30,000 feet, the B-29s had lost much of their previous altitude sanctuary as crews counted a jaw-dropping 984 fighter attacks.
On each Superfortress, central fire controllers handed off turrets to waist gunners and bombardiers, depending upon the direction of the threat. Gunners swung their controls, placed their sighting reticles on each fighter in turn, and opened fire as far out as 800 yards—nearly half a mile. The .50 calibers chattered incessantly, spewing a stream