Whirlwind - Barrett Tillman [53]
Probably no one did more to develop carrier tactics than “Billy Goat” Reeves. With his white Vandyke he was instantly recognizable to fliers and sailors alike. His four years with Langley were seminal; he experimented with procedures and techniques that would become standard in World War II. More embarked aircraft, faster operating tempos, and offensive missions rather than scouting all evolved on his watch. By the time he transferred out in 1931, the carrier navy was well on its way with two 33,000-ton giants, Lexington (CV-2) and Saratoga (CV-3). Reeves retired as a vice admiral in 1936 but was recalled to duty in 1940, serving in Washington throughout the war.
Naval airmen spent the 1920s and 1930s determining how best to integrate carriers into surface fleets, optimizing the roles of reconnaissance, observation, and attack. Eventually the world’s navies hit upon four basic roles for tailhook aircraft: scouts, torpedo planes, dive bombers, and fighters. The institutional differences were most notable in Britain, where the Royal Air Force retained control of naval aircraft until 1937. In contrast, American and Japanese naval aviators were fully integrated into their fleets.
In the 1930s, U.S. naval aviation’s seniority problem became so acute that older officers were run through flight training to fill the expanding number of aviation billets. The JCLs or Johnny Come Latelys included William Halsey and John S. McCain, both fifty-two when they pinned on their wings. More senior was Ernest J. King, a sour but formidably capable officer qualified in both submarines and aviation, who became chief of naval operations in 1942.
At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor the U.S. Navy had seven large carriers, four of which were sunk in 1942. But America’s vast industrial base began making up the deficit even as the battles roiled around islands called Midway and Guadalcanal.
Arguably the most nearly perfect instrument of sea power was the Essex class carrier, eleven being ordered in 1940’s massive naval budget. The name ship, designated CV-9, was commissioned in December 1942, setting the pattern for all her twenty-three sisters. She displaced 27,100 tons, carried eighty to 100 aircraft, and could make 32 knots. Cruising at 15 knots, she had fuel for 15,000 nautical miles, affording a fast, long-ranged offensive punch almost ideally suited to the Pacific Theater. The United States could not have successfully prosecuted the war without the Essexes, and for longevity the American taxpayer probably never got a better bargain.
Apart from the Essexes, American shipyards worked overtime to turn out smaller fast carriers. Nine light cruiser hulls were hastily modified to produce the Independence class CVLs, all delivered in 1943. At 10,600 tons displacement, they embarked some thirty-five aircraft and were capable of 31 knots. Shorter ranged than their CV stablemates, the Independences could cruise 13,000 miles at 15 knots. Though in combat from 1943 onward, and despite frequent battle damage, only one was sunk—testament to the soundness of the design.
In February 1945 the industrial miracle of the American home front manifested itself on Tokyo’s doorstep, with promise of more to come.
The Tailhook War
The Fifth Fleet was in the calm, capable hands of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, victor at Midway in 1942 and Philippine Sea in 1944. But the hand on the helm of Task Force 58 was Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, who had been flying since 1916. Just turned fifty-eight, he was a small, slight officer with a soft voice and almost diffident manner. He had made a hash of his tenure as first captain of Hornet, even allowing for her role in the Doolittle Raid. His tendency toward cronyism and inattention to detail nearly cost his career after the Battle of Midway, but he had already been selected for promotion, and he rebounded nicely.
By 1945, “Pete” Mitscher was