Whirlwind - Barrett Tillman [79]
* * * * *
After the March fire blitz and the kamikaze diversion there still remained much to do. The Army-Navy Joint Target Group had marked thirty-three urban areas for destruction, but Japan’s aviation industry remained the top priority. LeMay decided that with a growing force he could have it both ways. He would continue the daylight “precision” attacks against aircraft factories when sorties could be scheduled within the wider bombing campaign against other target sets.
A later generation would call LeMay’s philosophy a “force multiplier.” Not only was XXI Bomber Command going to conduct a two-phase campaign, it would do so with greater efficiency than before. As already demonstrated, the low-level missions against urban-industrial areas permitted double the bomb loads with less wear and tear on often overstressed engines. Thus, more sorties could be launched to destroy the dispersed factories that eluded precision attacks. Increasing emphasis was placed upon heavy industries producing machine tools, electrical systems, and ground-combat equipment such as artillery.
In order to continue a sustained effort, the 20th Air Force required increased logistic support, especially more bombs and fuel. LeMay needed to convince Admiral Chester Nimitz that the results would justify the logistic effort, and while the Pacific Theater commander was leery of the airman’s claim that crews could fly 120 hours per month—about eight missions—he saw the potential. Despite their cool relationship, LeMay was impressed with how Nimitz and the Navy delivered. Later he conceded, “How they got the ships and the supplies out there in six weeks I don’t know.”
Nor was that all. As reports of the devastation wrought upon Japan reached the Marianas, a surging spirit grew at pierside and spread inland. The attitude was contagious: not only Army Air Forces personnel but Army engineers, Navy Seabees, and even off-duty marines pitched in hauling ordnance from the docks. With so many willing hands, the airmen began bypassing the ordnance dumps, delivering bombs straight from cargo ships to the aircraft hardstands. There the weapons were loaded directly into waiting bomb bays, fitted with fuses, and made ready for the next mission.
If simplistic, the mood was clear: the more bombs on Japan, the sooner every GI, sailor, and marine could plan on going home.
While the constant arrivals and departures of supply ships in the Marianas represented a major endeavor, it was only one part of a massive whole. Nearly every bomb, bullet, and gallon of gasoline loaded into B-29s came by sea, but Chester Nimitz also oversaw other huge undertakings. That April, newly secured Iwo Jima required continual support, while the Okinawa campaign—the largest land battle of the Pacific War—was well underway amid the heightened kamikaze crisis.
Of necessity, Pacific Theater logistics was a joint-service operation. Nimitz’s J4 chief was an Army two-star general coordinating overall logistical planning, transportation priorities, fuel allotments, even medical facilities and general construction. Even so, there were interservice hitches. LeMay’s own supply officer, a colonel, had to find ways around the turf-protecting tendencies of the Army’s Central Pacific commander, a three-star with claims on shipping allotments. Ever the pragmatist, LeMay handled a potential clash by deciding not to ask too many questions of his subordinate.
That spring the Americans sought not merely air superiority—it had already been achieved—but outright air supremacy. Japanese airframe, engine, and propeller factories were targeted in an all-out effort to ensure control of the sky over the invasion