Whirlwind - Barrett Tillman [91]
Time over Japan
Always fuel-conscious, the Mustang pilots crossed the coast at a fairly high power setting to keep their spark plugs clean and their aircraft in fighting trim. They wanted the fuselage tank to contain less than forty gallons because in a steep turn, shifting fuel weight could cause the aircraft to roll violently.
To some pilots, the twenty to sixty minutes over Japan were just the thing to shake off the lethargy of the long northward flight. Harve Phipps recalled, “I think the combat break midway in the missions served to stimulate you enough that you didn’t get bored. The main problem was the cramped cockpit space for the time involved.”
For the return flight, Harry Crim explained, “We dropped our external tanks, shot up all our ammo, and tested the relief tube.” Then it was a matter of managing fuel for the 750-mile flight home. Cruising at forty gallons per hour could burn up a set of plugs but the hardy Merlin engines did not seem to mind.
In addition to bomber escort, the Mustangs flew an increasing proportion of strike missions. Their primary targets were Japanese airfields or industrial facilities, and P-51s were often loaded with five-inch high-velocity aerial rockets. Six HVARs added about 700 pounds to takeoff weight but they packed a tremendous punch—equal to a destroyer’s broadside—and proved effective against shipping and reinforced buildings.
Two coast-in points normally were used for sweep-strike missions. One was Inubo-Saki, a spit of land eighty miles east of Tokyo (Jimmy Doolittle’s crews had used it as a checkpoint). The other, more circuitous, route was fifty miles north of there at Kawagaro. The latter allowed P-51s to enter the Tokyo area from the northeast—an unexpected direction.
The first strafing mission was intended for April 16 against Atsugi, Japan’s largest airfield, but the P-51s were diverted to the Kanoya base, and in the confusion and poor visibility only fifty-seven of the 108 that took off actually attacked. Later missions were more successful, and from April 7 to June 30, VII Fighter Command claimed 666 enemy planes destroyed or damaged, mostly on the ground.
The standard strafing technique involved a squadron in close line astern flying at 1,500 feet and 200 mph. When the last flight leader was abreast of the field, he called for a 90-degree turn inbound. Each pilot then flew low across the field, shooting anything in front of him. At 200 mph there was time for careful aiming, and the sheer volume of fire from sixteen Mustangs’ ninety-six guns was often enough to suppress flak. “You could really put a lot of ammunition into a place” Crim remarked.
After the first pass, a smart fighter pilot kept going. Returning to an alerted, angry target did not enhance longevity, and nobody relished the thought of becoming a prisoner of the Japanese.
The Sunsetters’ last aerial combat occurred near Tokyo on August 10, when the 15th and 506th Groups claimed seven victories. In all, Iwo’s Mustangs were credited with 236 Japanese planes shot down between April and August 1945–80 percent of all Pacific Theater P-51 aerial victories.
Search and Rescue
In some crucial ways the Japanese represented the lesser enemy for American airmen in the Marianas and Iwo Jima. Flying vast distances over the North Pacific meant that losses at sea were unavoidable. In that immense expanse, the task of finding the minuscule yellow dot of a life raft approached the nearly impossible. Yet it was done.
Air-sea rescue began almost as an impromptu enterprise but grew into a thoroughly professional, joint-service operation. Before March 1, 1945, forty-eight Marianas Superfortresses ditched with 528 crewmen. All of the 164 located