Whirlwind - Barrett Tillman [95]
Having expressed his reservations about mining, once the order came down, LeMay said “Yes, sir,” and raised B-29 mining from Hansell’s previous group-strength effort. When the 313th Wing arrived in January 1945, LeMay immediately put Brigadier General J. H. Davies’s command to work, training for low-level, over-water night flying. Three years older than LeMay, the boyish, slender Davies was well qualified for the job: he had flown bombers since 1932 and commanded two combat groups, beginning in the dismal Philippine days of 1942 when he led “maximum effort” missions of three planes. One of the few commanders truly loved by his men, Davies was highly regarded as “a motivator and organizer.”
The timing was fortunate. With mining to begin around April 1, LeMay would have an extra four groups just as support of the Okinawa landings occurred. Therefore, he could have it both ways: comply with Nimitz’s and Arnold’s directives without diminishing either.
The prime choke point was obvious from a quick look at the map. Shimonoseki Strait between Kyushu and Honshu was the only outlet from the Inland Sea to the Sea of Japan. The Americans also monitored the eastern straits flanking Shikoku.
On the afternoon of March 27, “Skippy” Davies shoved his throttles forward and rolled down Tinian’s runway with 103 bombers behind him. In Operation Starvation’s debut, ninety-two Superfortresses dropped mines in their designated areas while three never returned. From that night on, Japan’s remaining large warships shunned Shimonoseki.
Three nights later eighty-five more “miners” placed their loads in the strait. Aerial reconnaissance was enthusiastically received on Guam: initial reports showed a 75 percent reduction in shipping transiting Shimonoseki. It looked as if the original minefields would be sufficient for up to two weeks, while much smaller missions mined the Kure-Hiroshima area containing Japanese fleet units.
Most mining missions required flying 3,200 miles round-trip, permitting a payload of 12,000 pounds of mines. The common types were 1,000- and 2,000-pound weapons, depending on availability. But they had to be delivered accurately, and aircrews were required to fly straight and level along predictable paths within reach of guns from shore. Though tension ran high among bomber crews, losses were blessedly low.
However, casualties were unavoidable, and all left a gap. On the night of July 9, the 6th Group lost a revered squadron commander, Lieutenant Colonel Elmer Dixon. Flight engineer Virgil Morgan recalled him as “an outstanding leader who had completed a North Africa tour before joining the Sixth.” Dixon was flying with the crew of Take It Off, a new plane that had not received black paint on the undersurfaces. Caught by searchlights, it was hit by flak and/or fighters, then exploded. Dixon was “very popular with the enlisted men for his willingness to talk and listen to us,” said Morgan.
Originally mines were fitted with magnetic or acoustic detonators, but many fell on land and, lacking self-destruct fuses, were examined by Japanese engineers. A countermeasures officer recalled, “On 27 May we recovered 30 mines and . . . we discovered the magnetic pressure type.” Shortly thereafter a low-frequency acoustic detonator was introduced, further complicating Japanese defenses.
Radar worked reasonably well for delivering mines. Sharp pictures were readily displayed because land and sea contrasted best on radar scopes, though bombardiers had to use “offset bombing” from identifiable landmarks since the water provided no aim point. The greatest complication was accurately assessing wind velocity, as the parachute-retarded mines could drift considerably when dropped from 5,000 to 6,000 feet.
Starvation became a joint operation between XXI Bomber Command and the Naval Mine Modification Unit on Tinian. The “ordies” provided the “flyboys” with a variety of options ranging from delay fuses to ship counters and various settings