Whirlwind - Barrett Tillman [97]
Fast Carriers Versus Japan
The invasion of Japan began on July 1, 1945. On that Sunday, Task Force 38 steamed from its Philippine anchorage, launching Phase One of Operation Olympic, the run-up to the Kyushu invasion planned for November. A series of strikes lasting into mid-August would establish air supremacy over the home islands, setting the stage for Operation Coronet, the Honshu landings.
Admiral Bull Halsey’s Third Fleet hierarchy included Vice Admiral John McCain, who had succeeded Marc Mitscher as commander of the fast carriers. Riding the new Essex class carrier Shangri-La, “Slew” McCain was considered “a real salty old dog” who cultivated a disheveled appearance. He affected a brimmed uniform hat with the grommets removed—strictly nonregulation—and was prone to dribble tobacco on himself when rolling a cigarette. A junior officer who had worked for him in Washington recalled “his striking resemblance to Popeye the Sailor . . . McCain looked as if he had slept in his uniform three nights running.”
Hailing from the Annapolis class of ’06, McCain was a JCL, a Johnny Come Lately to flying. He had received wings of gold in 1936 at age fifty-two and commanded the carrier Ranger but had little cockpit experience. (A subordinate said, “I don’t think he could fly an airplane to save his life.”) In 1942 McCain eked out an undistinguished record commanding aircraft in the South Pacific, then held administrative posts in Washington. However, he performed reasonably well commanding one of Mitscher’s task groups off the Philippines during late 1944 and ascended to command of Task Force 38 the next year. Not quite sixty-one, he had nine weeks to live before his heart failed.
Despite American air and sea supremacy, there was only so much that carrier aircraft could accomplish. In June, Rear Admiral Arthur Radford, a task group commander, noted that the fast carriers’ mission had changed. Previously a mobile striking arm, now TF 38 was less concerned with mobility than blockade. He conceded, “Working with the B-29s, we can do the pinpoint work on small targets, while the big bombers go after large industrial establishments.”
In truth, Radford—a future chief of naval operations—was acknowledging the Navy’s reduced status in the aviation hierarchy; blockade was essentially a defensive measure, whereas the greatest offensive airpower belonged to LeMay’s B-29s. That situation would continue if Operation Olympic-Coronet proceeded, when the carriers’ primary mission would be providing fighter screens over the invasion fleet. However, naval aviators would have a major investment in providing close air support for assault troops who crossed the high tide mark.
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Approaching the enemy coast on July 10, Third Fleet fully expected “the kamikaze boys” to come out in force, hence the welcome cover of weather. Only one Japanese plane was felled by Hellcats, fifty miles from the task force. When the first missions were launched, McCain’s aviators were astonished to find that they owned the sky over Tokyo. Not a single enemy rose to challenge them.
Tokyo ceded control of its homeland airspace for a valid reason. Expecting the invasion in October, the Japanese acknowledged the futility of engaging superior aircraft flown by more skillful pilots. Consequently, Tokyo began hoarding its airpower for massive suicide attacks