Why Leaders Lie - Mearsheimer, John J_ [43]
This perspective is wrong, however, because the causal arrow goes in the opposite direction: foreign policy behavior drives the creation of nationalist myths, not the other way around. Specifically, the rhetoric of nationalism is tailored to suit the behavior of states, which is driven largely by other calculations. For example, Germany’s aggressive behavior in the years leading up to World War I was driven mainly by concerns about the European balance of power, and the national myths that it deployed back then were largely designed to justify its belligerent actions.12 Israel’s efforts to control all of what was once called Mandatory Palestine and deny the Palestinians a state of their own has been a central part of the Zionist agenda since its inception in the late 1880s.13 Israel’s actions since its founding in 1948 have been largely consistent with that original Zionist vision, and have not been driven in any meaningful way by the various nationalist myths that Israelis have invented. The main purpose of those false stories has been to whitewash Israel’s brutal behavior toward the Palestinians, so that Israelis and their allies abroad think that Israel is always right and the Palestinians always wrong.
None of this is to deny that nationalism can be a potent cause of war. Indeed, it has been the most powerful ideology in the world over the past two centuries, and it has played a key role in tearing some states and empires apart, and has also led some countries to start wars with their neighbors. For example, Bismarck was motivated by nationalism as well as security concerns when he started and won wars in 1864, 1866, and 1870.14 His goal was not simply to expand Prussia’s borders and make it more secure, but also to create a unified German state. And remember that Zionism is effectively Jewish nationalism, and there was no way that the Zionists coming from Europe could create a Jewish state in all of Palestine without behaving aggressively toward the people who were already living in the region. So nationalism is clearly a major cause of war, but the myths that accompany it are not. At most, they have a secondary or tertiary effect on the making of a country’s foreign policy.
THE POTENTIAL COSTS OF LIBERAL LIES
Liberal lies also do not have a significant downside either at home or on the foreign-policy front. The same shared self-delusion that attends nationalist mythmaking tends to work here as well: most people do not recognize that lying is taking place, because they are inclined to believe that their own country almost always acts nobly. Thus, there is not much danger of blowback. But even in those rare instances when liberal lies do not work as intended and the public recognizes that their country has acted in an immoral or illegal way, there is not much danger of blowback, because most people understand that the rule book used in international politics is not the same one used inside their country’s borders.
The liberal lies that leaders tell also have little effect on how their country acts in the international arena. The same logic that underpins nationalist mythmaking applies here: statesmen and diplomats invariably do whatever they think is necessary to maximize their country’s security, regardless of what language they have employed to explain past and present actions. In other words, the causal arrow runs from foreign policy behavior to liberal rhetoric, not the other way around.
CHAPTER 9
Conclusion
It is clear from the historical record that although lying is often condemned as shameful behavior, leaders of all kinds think that it is a useful tool of statecraft that can and should be employed in a variety of circumstances.
Leaders not only tell lies to other countries, they also lie to their own people, and they do so because they believe it is in the best interest of their country. And sometimes they are right. Who would argue that statesman