Why Leaders Lie - Mearsheimer, John J_ [54]
21. The Powell quotes are from Richard Cohen, “Powellian Propaganda?” Washington Post, February 13, 2003; Iraq on the Record: The Bush Administration’s Public Statements on Iraq, Report prepared for Congressman Henry A. Waxman by the Minority Staff, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, March 16, 2004, 23; Transcript of Secretary Powell’s Press Conference, January 8, 2004. See also Derrick Z. Jackson, “Powell’s Shrinking Credibility on Iraq,” Boston Globe, January 14, 2004; Christopher Marquis, “Powell Admits No Hard Proof in Linking Iraq to Al Qaeda,” New York Times, January 9, 2004.
22. Spencer Ackerman and John Judis, “Deception and Democracy: The Selling of the Iraq War,” New Republic, June 30, 2003, 18; Douglas Jehl, “Report Warned Bush Team about Intelligence Doubts,” New York Times, November 6, 2005; Mark Mazzetti, “C.I.A. Said to Find No Hussein Link to Terror Chief,” New York Times, September 9, 2006; John Prados, “Phase II: Loaded for Bear,” TomPaine.com, November 10, 2005; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Postwar Findings about Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments, 109th Cong., 2d sess., September 8, 2006, 60–112; Jonathan Weisman, “Iraq’s Alleged Al-Qaeda Ties Were Disputed Before War,” Washington Post, September 9, 2006.
23. Walter Pincus and Dana Milbank, “Al Qaeda–Hussein Link Is Dismissed,” Washington Post, June 17, 2004.
24. Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 173.
25. For example, George Tenet, the head of the CIA in the run-up to the war, said in a speech on February 5, 2004: “We believe[d] that Iraq had lethal biological agents, including anthrax, which it could quickly produce and weaponize for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers and covert operatives. But we said we had no specific information on the types or quantities of weapons, agent or stockpiles at Baghdad’s disposal.” For a transcript of the speech, see “Tenet Defends Assessments of Iraqi Weapons,” New York Times, February 5, 2004. The Defense Intelligence Agency reported in September 2002 that there was no “hard” or “direct” evidence of chemical and biological stockpiles or production facilities. See Joseph Cirincione’s comments in Conference Call Briefing on Iraq’s Weapons (Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, February 3, 2004). See also Iraq on the Record, 15–16; Walter Pincus and Dana Priest, “Bush, Aides Ignored CIA Caveats on Iraq,” Washington Post, February 7, 2004; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Postwar Findings about Iraq’s WMD Programs, 26–43.
26. Iraq on the Record, 7.
27. Jackson, “Powell’s Shrinking Credibility.”
28. See Joseph Cirincione, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, and George Perkovich, WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications (Carnegie Endowment Report, January 2004), 86, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Iraq3FullText.pdf.
29. Ibid., 18, 95.
30. Ibid., WMD in Iraq, 20; Iraq on the Record, 16.
31. Cirincione, Mathews, and Perkovich, WMD in Iraq, 21.
32. See Pincus and Priest, “Bush, Aides Ignored CIA Caveats”; Iraq on the Record, 10–13; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Postwar Findings about Iraq’s WMD Programs, 17–21; Murray Waas, “What Bush Was Told about Iraq,” National Journal, March 2, 2006.
33. See Ackerman and Judis, “Deception and Democracy,” 15; Cirincione, Mathews, and Perkovich, WMD in Iraq, 21–28; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Postwar Findings about Iraq’s WMD Programs, 10–26; “Tenet Defends Assessments of Iraqi Weapons”; Greg Thielman’s comments in “Conference Call Briefing on Iraq’s Weapons”; Iraq on the Record, 7–15.
34. See Ronald Brownstein, “Support of U.S. Military Role in Mideast Grows,” Los Angeles Times, April 5, 2003; The Gallup Organization, Approval for Handling of War in Iraq Jumps, Poll Analysis, December 19, 2003; Adam Nagourney and Janet Elder, “Growing Number in U.S. Back War, Survey Finds,” New York Times, March 11, 2003; Tom Zeller, “The Iraq-Qaeda Link: A Short