Why Leaders Lie - Mearsheimer, John J_ [57]
54. Quoted in Ronald Bailey, “Origins of the Specious: Why Do Neoconservatives Doubt Darwin?” Reason, July 1997.
55. Walter Lippmann, “Why Should the Majority Rule?” in Clinton Rossiter and James Lare, eds., The Essential Lippmann: A Political Philosophy for Liberal Democracy (New York: Random House, 1963), 6–14; Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public (New York: Macmillan, 1927); Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Free Press, 1965).
56. Ian Kershaw, The “Hitler Myth”: Image and Reality in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 3.
57. Great powers that act as offshore balancers are invariably “insular states” as opposed to “continental states.” See John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 126–28. On the “stopping power of water,” see ibid., 114–28.
58. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 74–85. As John Schuessler notes, the incentives for leaders to deceive their public will be even greater if they anticipate that the preventive war will be long and bloody (“The Deception Dividend,” 135–142). Of course, the Bush administration expected a quick and easy victory in Iraq.
59. The Bush Doctrine, which was laid out in 2002 and which provided the rationalization for invading Iraq, made the case for fighting preemptive wars against gathering threats, when, in fact, the Bush administration was contemplating preventive wars against Iraq and other countries in the Middle East. See The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White House, September 2002); Remarks by the President to the Graduating Class, West Point (White House, Office of the Press Secretary, June 1, 2002).
Chapter 5
1. Ian Ousby, The Road to Verdun: World War I’s Most Momentous Battle and the Folly of Nationalism (New York: Anchor Books, 2003), 299. See also New York Times, “French Army Chief May Go,” December 7, 1916; Robert A. Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), chaps. 5–6; Walter Duranty, “Joffre-Gallieni Dispute Bared, New York Times, August 21, 1919; Walter Duranty, “Joffre Ousted by Intrigues,” New York Times, August 23, 1919; David Dutton, “The Fall of General Joffre: An Episode in the Politico-Military Struggle in Wartime France,” Journal of Strategic Studies 19, no. 3 (December 1978): 338–51; Jere Clemens King, Generals & Politicians: Conflict Between France’s High Command, Parliament, and Government, 1914–1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), chaps. 5–6; Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War (New York: Knopf, 1927), 39–40; Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Free Press, 1965), chaps. 1–2; David Mason, verdun (Moreton-in-Marsh, UK: Windrush, 2000), 9–12, 23–27, 133–37, 182, 190–91; Gordon Wright, Raymond Poincaré and the French Presidency (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1942), 193–98.
2. Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion: A Biography, trans. Peretz Kidron (New York: Delacorte, 1978), 203–6; Benny Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, 1949–1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War, rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), chap. 8; Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–1999 (New York: Knopf, 1999), 278–79; Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: Norton, 2000), 90–93.
3. Quoted in Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, 259.
4. Shlaim, Iron Wall, 91.
5. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 205.
6. Morris, Righteous Victims, 278–79.
7. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), 356–66; McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival (New York: Random House, 1988), 427–39, 445;