Why Leaders Lie - Mearsheimer, John J_.original_ [53]
4. As Robert Divine notes, “The submarine commander, far from being guilty of an unprovoked assault, had turned in desperation on his pursuer in an effort to escape destruction.” The Reluctant Belligerent: American Entry into World War II (New York: Wiley, 1967), 143.
5. All the quotations in this paragraph and the next are from Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 285–88; see also Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War, 744–46.
6. Among the best sources on the Gulf of Tonkin incident are: Eric Alterman, When Presidents Lie: A History of Official Deception and Its Consequences (New York: Viking, 2004), chap. 4; Joseph C. Goulden, Truth Is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin Affair; Illusion and Reality (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969); Robert J. Hanyok, “Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2–4 August 1964,” Cryptologic Quarterly 19 and 20, nos. 4 and 1 (Winter 2000 and Spring 2001), 1–55; David Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), chap. 11; Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), chap. 7; H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), chap. 6; Edwin E. Moïse, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Gareth Porter, Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), chap. 6.
7. Alterman, When Presidents Lie, 204–5.
8. Alterman, When Presidents Lie, 193. These are Alterman’s words.
9. Goulden, First Casualty, 50.
10. Hanyok, “Skunks,” 21–49; Moïse, Tonkin Gulf, 206–10, 241–43. See also Alterman, When Presidents Lie, 186–90.
11. Logevall, Choosing War, 198. These are Logevall’s words. See also Porter, Perils of Dominance, 196–98.
12. Kaiser, American Tragedy, 335–36.
13. Moïse, Tonkin Gulf, 243. These are Moïse’s words. It is now clear that there was no attack on the Maddox on August 4, 1964. Hanyok, “Skunks,” 3.
14. Moïse, Tonkin Gulf, 243.
15. These were the words used by McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk when testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on August 6. Logevall, Choosing War, 203. See also ibid., 198–99; and McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, 133–35, for similar comments by President Johnson and other senior administration officials.
16. Michael R. Beschloss, Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963–1964 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 494–95; Hanyok, “Skunks,” 5–12; Logevall, Choosing War, 201; McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, 121–30; Moïse, Tonkin Gulf, 99–105, 228–29, 239–41.
17. See Logevall, Choosing War, 199–203; Moïse, Tonkin Gulf, 99–105.
18. Alterman, When Presidents Lie, 205; Logevall, Choosing War, 203. One might argue that the Johnson administration told a third lie related to the Gulf of Tonkin incident. The president and his chief advisors claimed throughout 1964 and into early 1965 that they had no intention, much less plans, for escalating the war in Vietnam. In fact, Johnson portrayed himself as the peace candidate in his 1964 campaign for the presidency against Barry Goldwater. However, throughout that period, Johnson was actually laying the plans for expanding the war, as is evidenced by his behavior in the Gulf of Tonkin incident. For further elaboration on this matter, see Alterman, When Presidents Lie, chap. 4; Kaiser, American Tragedy, chap. 11; Logevall, Choosing War, 193–221, 242, 253, 314–15; Deborah Shapley,