Why Leaders Lie - Mearsheimer, John J_.original_ [61]
3. “Transcript of Special Counsel Fitzgerald’s Press Conference,” Washington Post, October 28, 2005. The best book about the Libby case is Michael Isikoff and David Corn, Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War (New York: Crown, 2006).
4. Ken Armstrong and Steve Mills, “Death Row Justice Derailed,” Chicago Tribune, November 14, 1999; Ken Armstrong and Steve Mills, “Inept Defenses Cloud Verdict,” Chicago Tribune, November 15, 1999; Ken Armstrong and Steve Mills, “The Jailhouse Informant,” Chicago Tribune, November 16, 1999; Ken Armstrong and Steve Mills, “A Tortured Path to Death Row,” Chicago Tribune, November 17, 1999; Ken Armstrong and Steve Mills, “Convicted by a Hair,” Chicago Tribune, November 18, 1999; Martha Irvine, “Illinois Governor Orders Death Penalty Moratorium,” Associated Press, January 31, 2000; Barry James, “Clearing of Illinois Death Row Is Greeted with Global Cheers,” New York Times, January 14, 2003; Paul M. Krawzak, “Ryan Explains Moratorium Call,” Copley News Service, January 31, 2000; Robert E. Pierre and Kari Lydersen, “Illinois Death Row Emptied,” Washington Post, January 12, 2003.
5. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956–1961: The White House Years (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), chap. 23; Peter Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait of the Hero (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 859–66.
6. See Andrew T. Guzmán, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), especially chap. 3.
7. Ann E. Sartori argues that “states often are tempted to bluff, or dissemble, but a state that is caught bluffing acquires a reputation for doing so, and opponents are less likely to believe its future communications.” Thus, states usually do not bluff or lie, because of the damage it might do to their reputation, and thus their prospects for future cooperation. “The prospect of acquiring a reputation for lying—and lessening the credibility of the state’s future diplomacy—keeps statesmen and diplomats honest except when fibs are the most tempting.” Deterrence by Diplomacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 5. I agree that reputation matters a lot to states in the realm of low politics and that this discourages lying, but, contrary to Sartori, I do not think reputation is important when dealing with matters relating to high politics. See Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).
8. As John M. Schuessler makes clear, however, Roosevelt’s deceptions in the run-up to the war with Japan did impede his conduct of the war in a variety of ways. “The Deception Dividend,” International Security 34, no. 4 (Spring 2010): 162–63. See also Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino- American Conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).
9. George Orwell, Orwell and Politics: Animal Farm in the Context of Essays, Reviews and Letters Selected from the Complete Works of George Orwell, ed. Peter Davison (London: Penguin, 2001), 357. Orwell also wrote, “The nationalist not only does not disapprove of atrocities committed by his own side, but has a remarkable capacity for not even hearing about them” (ibid., 363).
10. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York: New American Library, 1964), 134.
11. P. M. Kennedy, “The Decline of Nationalistic History in the West, 1900–1970,” Journal of Contemporary History 8, no. 1 (January 1973): 77–100; Stephen Van