Winston's War_ Churchill, 1940-1945 - Max Hastings [111]
The British director of naval operations, Capt. Ralph Edwards, wrote in his diary when the battleship commitment was made:
Another Prayer from the prime minister402, who wishes us to form a squadron of “fast, powerful modern ships—only the best to be used” in the Indian Ocean. This, he avers, will have a paralysing effect on the Japanese—why it should, the Lord alone knows … This, mind you, at the same time as he wishes to form a force at Malta, reinforce the Mediterranean, help Russia and be ready to meet a break-out by the Tirpitz. The amount of unnecessary work which that man throws on the Naval Staff would, if removed, get us all a month’s leave … If only the honourable gentleman were to confine himself to statesmanship and politics and leave naval strategy to those properly concerned, the chances of winning the war would be greatly enhanced. He is without doubt one of history’s worst strategists.
Churchill wrote to Roosevelt, reporting dispatch of Prince of Wales, Repulse and the carrier Indomitable: “There is nothing like having something that can catch and kill anything.”403 This was a bizarre assertion, after two years of war had demonstrated both the vulnerability of capital ships and the shortcomings of the Fleet Air Arm.
In almost all respects, during the Second World War the Royal Navy showed itself the finest of Britain’s three fighting services, just as the U.S. Navy was the best of America’s. Axis submarines and air attack inflicted heavy losses, but British seamen displayed consistently high courage and professionalism. The navy’s institutional culture proved more impressive than that of the army, perhaps also of the RAF. The Battle of the Atlantic was less visible and glamorous than the Battle of Britain, but preservation of the convoy routes was an equally decisive achievement. The sea service’s chronic weaknesses, however, were air support and antiaircraft defence. From the beginning to the end of the war, the Fleet Air Arm’s performance lagged far behind that of the U.S. Navy’s air squadrons, partly because of inadequate aircraft, partly because the British did not handle them so well, and partly because there were never enough carriers. Churchill served the navy’s interests poorly by failing to insist that the RAF divert more long-range aircraft to maritime support operations, and especially to help protect the Atlantic convoys.
As autumn turned to winter, there seemed little cause for optimism at sea, in the air, or on land. Shrewd old Field Marshal Smuts cabled Churchill from South Africa in considerable dismay on November 4: “I am struck by the growth of the impression here and elsewhere that the war is going to end in stalemate and thus fatally for us.” Many Americans perceived the British sitting idle behind their Channel moat, waiting for the United States to ride to their rescue. Averell Harriman wrote a personal letter to Churchill from Washington: “People are wondering why you don’t do something offensively404. In my opinion it is important that more should be said about what you are doing.” The diplomat urged energetic media promotion of the RAF’s bomber offensive, and of the Royal Navy’s convoys to Russia.
Smuts, meanwhile, believed that Russia was being beaten, and that the United States was still determined to avoid belligerence. This view was widely shared in London. Britain’s army vice chief of staff remained fearful of a German invasion of Britain, and baffled about how his own side might win the war: “Whatever may happen on the Russian front405, it is only by successful invasion of these islands that Hitler can definitely win the war … I wish we had so clear an idea of how we could win. At present we cling rather vaguely