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Though the new CIGS was often charmed by the prime minister’s puckish wit, and did not doubt his greatness, he and Churchill never achieved full mutual understanding. Brooke was disgusted by the selfishness of Churchill’s working habits, late hours and strategic flights of fancy. Like Dill and Wavell, he loathed war as much as the prime minister relished it. But he displayed a tenacity and resolve in the face of difficulties and Churchillian follies which Dill lacked. David Margesson, the secretary for war, said that Brooke was sustained by “his ability to shake himself like a dog411 coming out of water after unpleasant interviews with Winston, and … his power of debate (& his rasping voice).” The new CIGS was a harsh and ruthless man. These qualities equipped him to fulfil his role far more effectively than the mild-mannered Dill.

Brooke proved a superb planner and organiser. He gained nothing like the public celebrity of Montgomery and Alexander. The CIGS and prime minister could not be described as brothers in arms. But they forged a partnership in the direction of British strategy which, however stormy, served their nation wonderfully well. Churchill, so often accused of surrounding himself with acolytes and yes-men, deserves the utmost credit for appointing and retaining as CIGS an officer who, when their views differed, fought him to the last gasp. The ascent of Brooke, on the eve of another critical turning point in the war, was a great day for British arms.

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In the first days of December, a flood of intelligence revealed Japanese forces redeploying in Southeast Asia. The suspense was very great, as the British waited for Tokyo to reveal its objectives. To the end, there was apprehension that a Nipponese whirlwind might bypass the United States and its possessions. On Sunday, December 7, Churchill learned that Roosevelt proposed to announce in three days’ time that he would regard an attack on British or Dutch possessions in the Far East as an attack on America. That day at lunch, U.S. ambassador “Gil” Winant was among the guests at Chequers. Churchill asserted vigorously that if the Japanese attacked the United States, Britain would declare war on Japan. Winant said he understood that, for the prime minister had declared it publicly. Then Churchill demanded: “If they declare war on us412, will you declare war on them?” Winant responded: “I can’t answer that, Prime Minister. Only the Congress has the right to declare war under the United States constitution.” Churchill lapsed into silence. That terrible apprehension persisted, of facing the Japanese alone. Then he said, with his utmost charm: “We’re late, you know. You get washed and we will go into lunch together.”

Harriman, a fellow guest at dinner that night, found Churchill “tired and depressed413. He didn’t have much to say throughout dinner and was immersed in his thoughts, with his head in his hands part of the time.” Then they heard the radio news of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, and looked incredulously at one another. Churchill jumped up and started for the door, saying, “We shall declare war on Japan.” Within a few minutes, he and Winant were speaking by phone to Roosevelt. Soon afterwards the Admiralty called, reporting Japanese attacks on Malaya.

Churchill could not claim that his long campaign of seduction was responsible for U.S. entry into the war. This had followed only upon Japanese aggression. America’s policy of deterrence in the east, fortified by sanctions, had instead provoked Tokyo to fight. Though the “day of infamy” resolved many dilemmas and uncertainties, it is unlikely that Roosevelt viewed Pearl Harbor with the same enthusiasm as the prime minister. Events had produced an outcome which the president, left to himself, would not have willed or accomplished for many months—if ever. What is certain is that Churchill had sown seeds of a fertility such as only he could have nurtured, for a harvest which he now gathered.